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TRADE SECRETS: HOW THE CHARMING BETSY
CANON MAY DO MORE TO WEAKEN U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS THAN THE WTO'S
TRADE RULES
Kevin P. Cummins*
Our sovereignty is not threatened by this agreement or by the
WTO. The WTO has no power to force the United States to do
anything. They cannot make us do anything. It is not a world power.
If the WTO finds that a U.S. law does not square with the obligations
we have assumed under the agreement, we remain totally free to
disregard that finding. It does not change U.S. law.
Senator Robert Dole, excerpts from Senate floor debate on S.
2467,
140 CONG. REc. 30,199 (1994).
[I]t is our conclusion that the Uruguay Round Agreement poses
the single greatest and broadest threat to consumer and
environmental laws and the democratic establishment of such
policies. It is on this basis that we urge the Congress to reject this
agreement.
Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen's Trade
Program, testimony at hearings on S. 2467 before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, October 17, 1994.
J.D. Candidate, May 2001. The author would like to thank
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INTRODUCTION
During the last fifty years, the United States has vigorously
pursued global trading policies to expand its markets. This has been
accomplished primarily through participation in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO").' During the last thirty years, the U.S. has
also implemented domestic policies to protect the environment.2 The
U.S. now has some of the strongest environmental laws and
regulations of any nation? Recently, however, U.S. goals of
expanded trade and environmental protection have collided, leaving
the future and integrity of certain environmental protections
uncertain.
The only way to separate the increasingly explosive rhetoric
surrounding this issue4 from an accurate understanding of the
1. The World Trade Organization was formed in 1994 when the
final General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was signed by
contracting member nations. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. From 1947 until 1994, the
GATT governed international trade for contracting member nations and
continues to govern trade under the WTO. The WTO primarily operates to
ensure the GATT's implementation and settles disputes between individual
nations.
2. See Ilyssa Bimbach, Note, Newly Imposed Limitations on
Citizens' Right to Sue for Standing in a Procedural Rights Case, 9
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 311, 313-18 (1998) (describing the early history of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which was
the first legislation to address environmental concerns on the national
level). See also Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, at
http://www.epa.gov/history/ topics/epa/15c.htm (describing the formation
of the EPA under the Nixon Administration) (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
3. See, e.g., Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental
Regulatory Reform-ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing or a
Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 35, 35 (1999) (arguing that despite
the U.S.'s complex and far-reaching environmental laws and regulations,
regulatory reform is needed).
4. See Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, Trade Obstacles
Unmoved, Seattle Talks End in Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at A6
(describing how the rebellion of developing countries inside the WTO
Seattle Ministerial meeting and the violent protests of WTO detractors in
Seattle's streets led to a collapse of the talks between WTO member
nations in December 1999).
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WTO's power and role in world trade is to examine the relevant
agreements and legislation. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT"), domestic environmental laws are often viewed
as non-tariff trade barriers and, as such, can be challenged as
violations of the GATT by WTO member nations.' These challenges
are made before WTO dispute resolution panels and Appellate
Bodies. Moreover, if a member nation mounts a successful
challenge, the WTO ruling often recommends that the challenged
nation change its domestic law or regulation to comply with the
GATT.6 Environmentalists and others have expressed concerns that
this adjudicatory framework threatens national sovereignty, in that
an unelected international body can issue rulings requiring changes
5. The GATT is a comprehensive agreement that regulates trade
mainly by lowering tariffs. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The
Preamble to the agreement reads in part:
Recognizing that their [the signatories] relations in the field
of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a
view to raising the standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce ....
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 4 B.I.S.D. 1, 61
Stat. All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]
(emphasis added).
6. The Final Act provides:
Where a panel or Appellate Body concludes that a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend
that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity
with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the
panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
Final Act, Annex .11, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, art. XVIIII [hereinafter DSU], supra note 1.
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in domestic environmental laws and regulations.7 However, a closer
look at the Uruguay Round Agreements Act' ("URAA"), the
legislation that codified the GATT, reveals that U.S. interests and
sovereignty are protected; and under U.S. law, the executive branch
may choose whether and how to respond to adverse WTO rulings.'
7. See GA.TT Implementing Legislation: Hearings to Review
Trade Agreements Concluded Under the Uruguay Round of GATT
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Including Provisions Establishing the
World Trade Organization. Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 206-
07, 221 (Oct. 17, 1994), microformed on CIS No. 94-S261-62 (Cong. Info.
Serv.) (statement of Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth)
(stating "GATT could impact U.S. environmental laws. It could impact the
environmental laws of other countries all around the world .... We are
totally shocked at the prospect of creating a new, international institution
which is fundamentally antidemocratic and closed to participation of the
peoples of the world."); (prepared statement of Lori Wallach, Director,
Public Citizen's Trade Program) ("[I]t is our conclusion that the Uruguay
Round Agreement poses the single greatest and broadest threat to
consumer and environmental laws and the democratic establishment of
such policies. It is on this basis that we urge the Congress to reject this
agreement."). Id. at 221; Martin Wagner & Patti Goldman, The Case for
Rethinking the WTO: The Full Story Behind the WTO's Environment and
Health Cases 20 (1999) (stating that the WTO "has made trade officials the
arbiters of disputes and shunned sharing decision-making power with
health and environmental officials, experts and nongovernmental
organizations. These issues are far too critical to be 'left to an institution
that represents only one perspective and goal."), at http://www.earthjustice.
org/work/intlindex.html (pdf file) (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (1994)). Throughout the paper, the codified U.S.C.
provisions will be referenced. When referring to the legislation generally,
"URAA" will be used.
9. The URAA provides for the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") to consult with congressional committees when a
WTO decision "potentially entails a change in Federal or State law." 19
U.S.C. § 3532(b) (1994). In addition, regarding such potential changes in
U.S. law, the USTR is to inform the appropriate congressional committee
of "the action the President intends to take in response to the decision or,
if the President does not intend to take any action, the reasons therefor."
Id. at (c)(1)(E) (emphasis added). Cf LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE 13-27 (2d ed. 1979), in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 1995) ("For foreign policy,
perhaps the most important legal mechanism is the international
agreement, and the most important principle of international law is pacta
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What is less well known and reported is how U.S. courts view and
interpret the URAA.
Ironically, the U.S.'s ability to choose whether and how to comply
with adverse WTO rulings may be threatened more by U.S. court
decisions than by WTO rulings. While the WTO cannot order or
force the U.S. to change its environmental laws or regulations," U.S.
courts can review regulations promulgated by executive branch
agencies. When environmental regulations come under review, U.S.
courts often examine the regulation in question using a Chevron"
sunt servanda: agreements shall be observed. This principle makes
international relations possible."). As a world leader, the United States
cannot afford to categorically refuse to comply with adverse rulings, but
the URAA and the DSU provide a flexible framework to foster compliance
on a case-by-case basis. See infra note 161 and accompanying text for a
discussion of options available under the DSU.
10. During Senate debate, Senator Dole stated:
Our sovereignty is not threatened by this agreement or by the
WTO. The WTO has no power to force the United States to
do anything. They cannot make us do anything. It is not a
world power. If the WTO finds that U.S. law does not square
with the obligations we have assumed under the agreement,
we remain totally free to disregard that finding. It does not
change U.S. law.
140 CONG. REc. 30,199 (1994). Senator Dole did, however, urge the
Clinton administration to consider creating- a special WTO Dispute
Settlement Review Commission that would review adverse WTO rulings
in an effort to appease senators who had concerns over sovereignty. See
Barry E. Carter, International Trade Law: Where Congress Has, Somewhat
Hesitantly, Bought Into International Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
335, 336 (1998). Carter asserts that the Dole proposal "served as a
convenient escape valve for some conservatives concerned about U.S.
sovereignty in 1994, but the eventual proposed bill died in Congress in
1995. The concerns over sovereignty had dissipated considerably." Id. at
336. See also U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, at 59 (Aug.
1994) (stating that adverse WTO "[p]anel reports-whether adopted or
not-will not have any binding force as a matter of U.S. law. The
appropriate federal and state executive and legislative authorities would
decide how to respond under domestic law to any adverse panel
recommendation.").
11. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court crafted a two-part test for use in
cases when agency regulations come under review. The Court must first
determine whether Congress has addressed the issue in question; if so, the
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analysis, in which a court defers to either or both of the political
branches on questions of a statute's or regulation's interpretation.
Recently, however, some courts have been introducing another tool
into the rules-of-construction toolbox: the "Charming Betsy" canon
that urges a court not to construe an act of Congress in a manner that
conflicts with international law.12
This Note examines the problems that are created when Chevron
and Charming Betsy are both raised in environmental regulation
cases that implicate the URAA. More specifically, this Note
considers the problems faced by the courts and the political branches
when a court attempts to reconcile the two. In the process, the Note
attempts to challenge the popular arguments-that WTO
membership weakens U.S. sovereignty-while raising another
argument: that U.S. environmental laws may be threatened more by
U.S. courts that apply international law principles in URAA-related
cases. The discussion focuses on the language of the URAA, which
explicitly states that whenever the GATT's provisions conflict with
existing environmental or other laws, the existing domestic laws will
agency action taken or regulation promulgated must conform to the will of
Congress. If Congress is silent on the matter in question, the court must
then determine whether the agency's actions or regulations pass a
reasonableness test. Id. at 842-44.
12. See Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
The case involved the Supreme Court's interpretation of an act of Congress
that suspended trade with France, and whether or not when construed in
light of international law, it should have been upheld and applied to a
particular ship owner who was born in America but later became a Danish
citizen. Id. at 115-21. The passage from the Charming Betsy case often
referred to reads:
It has also been observed that an act of congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains, and, consequently, can never
be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral
commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as
understood in this country.
Id. at 118. The "law of nations" is an anachronistic term that "encompassed
more than is comprehended by 'international law' today, apparently
including admiralty and general principles of the 'law merchant' applicable
to transnational transactions." Louis Henkin, International Law:
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555,
1555 n.1 (1984) (citation omitted). For the most part, the terms 'law of
nations' and 'international law' are now used synonymously.
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prevail. 3 Also reviewed is part of the legislative history of the
URAA, primarily found in the Statement of Administrative Action
("SAA"), which provides a roadmap for courts, future
administrations and congresses to follow when interpreting the
URAA.
14
After setting out some background on the GATT and the WTO,
Part II examines three GATT/WTO rulings where U.S.
environmental regulations were successfully challenged by WTO
member nations, resulting in the U.S. modifying its regulations. A
companion line of private cases is also examined where
environmental, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") sued
various executive branch agencies to compel stricter enforcement of
environmental regulations. In each case, the agencies were ordered
to enforce the environmental regulations according to the will of
Congress; and in many of these cases, the suits were brought either
in response to or in anticipation of a WTO-induced regulation
modification. Part III examines another line of cases involving
URAA-related litigation where the Charming Betsy canon was
raised either by one of the parties or by the court itself. This Part will
also summarize the WTO/U.S. jurisprudence to date. Part IV
concludes by arguing that if the Charming Betsy canon is
permanently appended to the Chevron analysis, when both are
invoked, the balance that the executive branch seeks in weighing
13. The URAA supremacy language reads: "No provision of any
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law
of the United States shall have effect." 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (1994).
14. See Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 4040 (expressing the Administration's intent
regarding the URAA to which Congress defers on matters of
interpretation) [hereinafter SAA]. The URAA itself also references the
SAA:
The statement of administrative action approved by the
Congress under section 3511 (a) of this title shall be regarded
as an authoritative expression by the United States concerning
the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round
Agreements and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which
a question arises concerning such interpretation or
application.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (1994) (emphasis added). See also infra note 172 for a
discussion of the SAA text regarding regulation modifications.
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trade and environmental policies could be tipped and environmental
protections weakened.15
15. Certain U.S. environmental laws might prove vulnerable under
the GATT if challenged in the future. These laws could be weakened
significantly, not by an adverse WTO ruling, but by a U.S. court ruling that
in effect honors a WTO ruling. For example, in 1990, Congress passed
legislation banning the export of unprocessed timber originating from
Federal lands. The statute reads in part:
No person who acquires unprocessed timber originating from
Federal lands west of the 100th meridian in the contiguous 48
States may export such timber from the United States, or sell,
trade, exchange, or otherwise convey such timber to any other
person for the purpose of exporting such timber from the
United States, unless such timber has been determined under
subsection (b) of this section to be surplus to the needs of
timber manufacturing facilities in the United States.
16 U.S.C. § 620(a) (1994). Japan has threatened to challenge this law
before the WTO and some environmentalists believe that the U.S. might
not be in a position to simply decline with impunity Japan's request for
lumber, nor will the ban fall under the GATT's environmental exceptions.
See Patti Goldman & Joe Scott, Our Forests at Risk.: The World Trade
Organization's Threat to Forest Protection 15 (1999), at http://www.
earthjustice.org/work/intlindex.html (pdf file) (footnotes omitted) (last
visited Dec. 1, 2000). See also Ross W. Gorte & Kenneth R. Thomas,
Restricting Softwood Log Exports: Policy and Legal Implications,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 93-738 ENR, at 12
(Aug. 13, 1993), construed in Goldman & Scott, at 15. The report
concluded that the environmental exceptions under the GATT would likely
not apply to U.S. lumber export bans
unless timber projections were to indicate that the national or
local timber supply was in immediate or long-term danger of
being depleted. As the [GATT] exceptions appear to be
intended for application where resource reserves are in actual
decline, it would appear to be necessary to establish this
factual basis in order to invoke the exception.
Id. at 15. But see Accelerating Tariff Liberalization in the Forest Products
Sector: A Study of the Economic and Environmental Effects 1 (Sept. 1999)
(reporting that a joint study by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
and the White House Council on Environmental Quality concluded that the
ATL initiative [an agreement that will eventually eliminate all tariffs on
lumber products] will likely have no environmental impacts), at
http://www.ustr.gov.releases/1999/11/99-91.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
The U.S. export ban could be viewed as a trade barrier under the GATT's
trading rules. This type of restraint on a nation enforcing its domestic
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I. BACKGROUND
A. GA TT/URAA-Related Litigation in U.S. Courts
Since Congress passed the URAA in late 1994, there have not
been many URAA-related cases tried before U.S. courts. The URAA
does not authorize private suits. 6 Consequently, when a URAA-
related litigation arises, it is often because a party challenges an
executive branch agency regulation passed in anticipation of, or in
response to, a WTO ruling. A court must then construe the URAA in
light of the potentially conflicting environmental regulation or
statute. The URAA states that whenever a domestic statute conflicts
with an obligation under the URAA, the domestic statute must
prevail. 7 However, some courts have been applying the Charming
Betsy canon in URAA-related cases. The cases discussed below
demonstrate that the Charming Betsy analysis may upset the
statutory framework that Congress and the executive branch have
constructed, and therefore, may be inappropriate in URAA-related
cases. 18
environmental protections is what concerns many environmentalists. As
this paper suggests, however, U.S. courts, not the WTO, may hold the keys
to ensuring that environmental regulations remain intact when the
regulations conflict with the GATT's rules. If a U.S. court applies
international principles of deference and compels the U.S. to honor its
international obligations, such a decision would, in effect, codify an
adverse WTO ruling and would be binding.
16. In relevant part, the URAA reads:
No person other than the United States-(A) shall have any
cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an
agreement, or (B) may challenge, in any action brought under
any provision of law, any action or inaction by any
department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United
States . . . on the ground that such action or inaction is
inconsistent with such agreement.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part IV.
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B. The GATT and the WTO
In 1947, the United States and other nations began a series of tariff
and trade negotiations with the goal of promoting sustainable
development throughout the world. The product of these agreements
is called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT. 9
Trade talks proceeded in various rounds until 1994 when the final
round was completed and the WTO was formed.2" There are now
140 signatories to the agreement.2 The GATT governs trade
between member nations, and when disputes arise the Final Act
provides for member nations to settle disputes.22 If the member
nations do not resolve disputes on their own, the WTO assembles a
panel to hear the dispute and each affected nation presents its case
before the panel.23 Although dispute resolution before a WTO panel
is adjudicatory in nature, nations are encouraged to negotiate
bilateral and multilateral settlements. 4
19. See generally Amelia Porges, The Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 63 (Terence P. Stewart
ed., 1996) (discussing the history of the GATT and early agreements).
20. See supra notes 1 and 5 and accompanying text.
21. See The WTO, Fact File (stating that as of November 30,
2000, there were 140 member nations in the WTO), at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewtoe/thewtoe.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In 1997, the Deputy
Director General of the WTO stated "[t]he WTO performs three basic
functions: It is the place where members negotiate trade rules and
concessions for liberalization; it monitors those agreements via twenty-five
standing committees and councils and more than 200 notification
requirements; finally, it provides a means for settling disputes over rules
and concessions." Warren Lavorel, The World Trade Organization:
Looking Ahead, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 20, 22 (1997).
23. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the DSU.
24. See infra note 161 and accompanying text for a discussion of
why the flexibility available under the DSU should not be undermined by
U.S. court application of Charming Betsy. See also Richard 0.
Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and Dispute Settlement in the
World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 581, 588-89 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996)
(comparing dispute settlement under the GATT and under the Final Act
establishing the WTO). In addition, the authors point out that the Dispute
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In 1994, the WTO was created and the GATT was finalized,
ending a half-century of tariff and trade negotiations between many
of the world's nations.2 5 It also began a new era of international trade
and ushered in a trade regime unlike any seen before. Like the other
member nations, the U.S. seeks to protect and foster its domestic
interests while honoring its obligations under the GATT, which now
has legal effect. 6 These interests have come into conflict during the
last ten years, where complaining member nations under the
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system have challenged U.S.
environmental regulations. 7 In each of the cases discussed below,
the U.S. environmental regulations were found to violate the GATT,
and the U.S. chose to amend its laws and/or their implementation. 8
Settlement Understanding only applies to "disputes between WTO
members related to issues covered by WTO agreements. These rules would
not apply, for instance, to any U.S.-China dispute until China joins the
WTO, nor to a U.S.-EU dispute over investment measures not addressed in
the Uruguay Round's Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement." Id.
at 589. Cf Helene Cooper & David Rogers, China Trade Bill Passes Final
Test: Senate, WALL ST. J., Sept., 20, 2000, at A2 (reporting that the U.S.
Senate voted to normalize trade relations with China, which was the last
obstacle to China's entrance into the World Trade Organization. WTO
officials state that China's entry is expected to be finalized by the year's
end).
25. See What is the WTO? (describing how member nations
continue to negotiate various side agreements within the WTO
framework), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatis_e
.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2000).
26. The Final Act reads in part: "The WTO shall have legal
personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions." Final Act,
art. VIII, supra note 1.
27. See supra note 6 and infra note 161 discussing the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism.
28. See Hdkan Nordstr6m & Scott Vaughan, Trade and
Environment Report, Annex I, IV (Oct. 1999) (summarizing the three U.S.
cases discussed infra Part II.A-C, and others), at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratope/envire/stud99_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2000). It is
important to note that the U.S. has challenged other member nations as
well. For example, the United States and Canada challenged a European
Economic Community import ban on hormone-treated beef. A WTO panel
agreed that the ban violated Articles III and V of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the Final Act,
respectively, because the EEC ban was "imposed without scientific
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C. Trade Leverage and Environmental Protections Under the WTO
Historically, nations have negotiated bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements, which have often included economic and non-
economic restrictions as a way to gain leverage and secure
concessions. 9 Using such leverage in order to gain compliance with
environmental standards has been common.3" As the cases discussed
below demonstrate, however, using trade leverage against a nation
that does not meet U.S. environmental standards is a risky path to
take under the WTO.31 Some view such trade leverage tactics not
only as prohibitive under the GATT, but as a flawed and ineffective
way to achieve environmental protections.32 Under the GATT,
import restrictions on goods produced or processed by methods that
threaten the environment are often found to violate the GATT's
provisions,33 despite the Final Act's stated goal of promoting
sustainable development and environmental protections.34
justification" and because it was not based on a "risk assessment." Id.
Annex I, at 84.
29. See generally Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse Of Trade
Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the
Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REv. 1 (1999) (discussing
the history of U.S. trade leverage and policy generally, and its use in the
tuna/dolphin dispute in particular).
30. Id.
31. See infra Part IIA-C.
32. One commentator has stated that the problem with trade
leverage measures is their
tendency . . .. to displace, rather than energize, good-faith
negotiation over ways and means to protect the commons.
From this single problem, all other hazards spring. To avoid
them trade leverage must be recognized and used as an
instrument of diplomacy, not a substitute for it. It must be
used to energize negotiations with foreign states, producers,
or both, not to try to trump them.
Parker, supra note 29, at 119.
33. See Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle
Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the Environment, and International
Trade Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 295, 296 n.5 (2000) (discussing the
differences between goods produced or processed by methods that threaten
the environment ("PPMs") and "product-motivated restrictions," which are
legal under GATT. "This latter type of restriction 'prevent[s] the product
itself from degrading the environment within the importing country."'
(quoting John J. Barcelo III, Product Standards to Protect the Local
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There are at least two flaws in the WTO's ability to address
environmental issues. First, while the Final Act's preamble asserts
the goal of sustainable development, no major environmental
agreements were adopted as a part of the Final Act. Second, the
WTO committee that was established to address trade and
environmental issues is new and considered relatively weak.35 Some
have criticized the Committee on Trade and the Environment's
("CTE's") work, and questioned its effectiveness in treating an
ongoing problem: the status of domestic, unilateral environmental
laws passed before the Final Act.36
Environment-The GATT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755, 756 (1994))). The
GATT states that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes
or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party.... ." GATT, art. XI. i, supra note 5. The Richards
& McCrory article provided the citations for the cases discussed infra Part
II.E.
34. The Preamble to the Final Act establishing the WTO declares
its objective of "sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development.. . ." Final Act, Preamble, supra note 1,
at 1144.
35. See Final Act, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at
1267. The Committee on Trade and the Environment ("CTE") has a two-
fold mandate: "(a) to identify the relationship between trade measures and
environmental measures, in order to promote sustainable development; (b)
to make appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the
provisions of the multilateral trading system are required, compatible with
the open, equitable and non-discriminatory nature of the system. . . ." Id.
at 1268. In addition, there are environmental exceptions in Article XX of
the GATT, but they are often construed so broadly or narrowly so as to be
of no effect. See infra notes 53, 106 and 169 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Article XX's provisions.
36. One critic of the WTO's CTE has stated:
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE) has declined even to discuss a
possible role for unilateral trade measures in obtaining
conservation agreements: the Committee's mandate was
deliberately drafted to exclude it. The CTE's deliberations on
measures "pursuant to" environmental agreements have been
uninformed and yielded no recommendations.
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An area of constant discord between member nations and the
WTO is environmental protection. Environmental concerns were not
part of the original GATT37 and these issues are only now being
addressed. Indeed, the WTO admits that it lacks any mechanism to
administer comprehensive environmental policies.38 Until the CTE
establishes itself in advisory, policymaking and dispute resolution
roles, however, it is unlikely that environmental concerns of member
nations will ever garner more or even as much priority as the WTO's
main goal of fostering free trade. 9
Parker, supra note 29, at 5 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
37. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, at ES-2
(Aug. 1994) ("When the General Agreement was originally drafted more
than 40 years ago, environmental policy was in its infancy. Consequently,
the GATT does not refer to environmental measures as such.").
38. See Work of the Trade and Environment Committee (1999), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min99_e/english/aboute/
13envie.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2000). The WTO admits that
it is not intended that the WTO should become an
environmental agency. Nor should it get involved in
reviewing national environmental priorities, setting
environmental standards or developing global policies on the
environment. That will continue to be the task of national
governments and of other intergovernmental organizations
better suited to the task.
Id.
39. In addition to the CTE's relative weakness, another hurdle for
nations seeking to enforce domestic environmental laws is that before the
WTO era, member nations could veto adverse panel decisions; under the
WTO, vetoes are not permitted and rulings have legal effect, barring a
rejection of the decision by a consensus among all members. See DSU, art.
XVI.4, supra note 6; Cunningham & Smith, supra note 24, at 585. The
Dispute Settlement Understanding reads in part: "An Appellate Body
report shall be adopted by the [Dispute Settlement Body] DSB and
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30
days following its circulation to the Members." DSU, art. XVII.14, supra
note 6. And with each member nation having one vote in the WTO, U.S.
hegemony has no effect before committee and panel adjudications, and
decisions based on unsuccessful appeals are final. See generally G. Pascal
Zachary, Who's Running This Show? A Reckoning for the WTO, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 5, 2000, at A21 (suggesting that because the U.S. is no longer a
hegemonic power in trade, the WTO at times suffers from a lack of
direction and leadership).
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II. THREE GATT/WTO PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY RULINGS4°
During the past ten years, the U.S. has lost several environmental
disputes with other member nations of the GATT and the WTO. In
each of these cases, the complaining member nation challenged a
U.S. environmental regulation alleging that the laws were
discriminatory and violated provisions in the GATT. In each case,
the U.S. responded by amending its environmental regulations in
dispute.
A. The Tuna/Dolphin Case
In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean certain species of tuna travel
with pods of dolphins." A commonly used method of catching tuna
involves chasing dolphins and tuna and encircling them with nets.
This method, called "purse seines," often results in large numbers of
dolphins being inadvertently harmed or killed.42 In an effort to lessen
the harm to dolphins, Congress passed the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972,"3 which established a general prohibition
against the "taking" (harassment, hunting, capture, killing or attempt
thereof) of marine life, unless authorized by exception.' In 1990, the
National Marine Fisheries Service promulgated regulations limiting
the numbers of permitted incidental takings of marine mammals by
U.S. fisherman.45 Originally applicable only to U.S. fisherman, the
regulations were extended to ban imports of all commercial fish or
40. The purpose of setting out the Tuna/Dolphin case, the
Reformulated Gasoline case, and the Shrimp/Turtle case is to provide
background to the disputes that occur with WTO member nations in
general. It is also to set up the discussions of the private suits that follow
the WTO cases, and to synthesize all of the cases in light of the Charming
Betsy canon.
41. Wagner & Goldman, supra note 7, at 8; 16 U.S.C. § 1385(b)
(1994).
42. See Wagner & Goldman, supra note 7, at 8.
43. Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as amended, notably by
Pub. L. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988) and by Pub. L. 101-627, 104 Stat.
4465 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994)).
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1) (1994) (providing certain
exceptions for scientific research and educational purposes, among others).
45. 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.3, 216.24 (1999). The National Marine
Fisheries Service promulgates and enforces the regulations authorized by
the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
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fish products caught with technology that yielded levels of incidental
killing of dolphins higher than that allowed under U.S. law.46 In
November 1990, Mexico requested consultations with the U.S.
concerning the restrictions on imports of tuna and tuna products.47
When mutually satisfactory results did not emerge after sixty days,
Mexico initiated the dispute resolution process under the GATT.48
Despite this challenge, in April 1991, the U.S. Customs Service
implemented an embargo on imports of yellowfin tuna harvested
with purse seine nets by vessels from Vanuatu, Venezuela and
Mexico.49
Among other complaints, Mexico asked the GATT panel to find
that the U.S. import restrictions on tuna were inconsistent with the
general prohibition of quantitative restrictions under the GATTV °
The U.S. asked the GATT panel to find that the restrictions were
consistent with the GATT provisions requiring each contracting
nation to treat imported products no less favorably than products of
national origin. 1 The U.S. argued that because the restrictions also
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D)-(E) (1994) (describing how the
Secretary of Commerce may certify nations that use methods that lower the
number of incidental killings).
47. See Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1598 (1991) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna Panel
Report].
48. Id. at 1598.
49. Id. at 1600.
50. Id. at 1601. Article XI.1 reads:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on
the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for
the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, art. XI. 1, supra note 5.
51. Id. at 1601. Article 111.4 reads in part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any another contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use ....
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applied to U.S. fisherman, all parties were receiving equal
treatment. 2 The U.S. also argued that even if the import ban was not
exempted, the provisions should be covered under the GATT's
environmental exceptions. 3
The panel found that the U.S. ban on tuna imports on nations not
certified under U.S. guidelines violated the GATT because the
regulations (1) were intended to reduce the incidental takings rate of
marine mammals; (2) did not regulate the domestic sale of tuna; and
(3) "could not possibly affect tuna as a product." 4 The panel also
rejected the U.S.'s arguments that the restrictions fell under the
GATT's environmental exceptions. The panel stated that the
exceptions were to be construed narrowly.5 Generally, the panel
rejected the broad interpretation urged by the U.S., opining that if
one nation could unilaterally impose health protection policies on
another, parties' rights would be jeopardized under the GATT and
the entire multilateral framework would be weakened. 6 The decision
stated that the U.S. should have pursued a cooperative agreement
through negotiations rather than unilaterally imposing domestic
restrictions on one of its trading partners. 7 And the panel reminded
GATT, art. 111.4, supra note 5.
52. Id. at 1603-04.
53. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 47, at 1601. The GATT's
environmental exceptions permit nations to adopt measures "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health," and measures "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption." GATT, art. XX(b), (g), supra note 5; see also infra note
169 and accompanying text.
54. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 47, at 1618. The U.S. position
was again challenged in 1992-93 by the European Union (EU) based on the
same regulations. The panel's ruling was almost identical to the first Tuna
panel's ruling. See Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (not adopted).
55. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 47, at 1619.
56. Id. at 1620.
57. See id. See also Work of the Trade and Environment
Committee (1999) (stating that "[t]hroughout the discussions on this issue
in the WTO, it has become clear that the preferred approach for
governments to take in tackling transboundary or global environmental
problems is through cooperative, multilateral action under an MEA."), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min99_e/english/aboute/1
3envie.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2000); Annick Emmenegger Brunner,
Conflicts Between International Trade and Multilateral Environmental
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the U.S. that it could not unilaterally impose restrictions on another
nation simply because it disagreed with its policies. 8 According to
the panel, the U.S. could have also raised the duties on such products
or exercised other rights available under the GATT. 9 At least one of
the U.S.'s efforts to protect dolphins, however, remained intact.
The only bright spot for the U.S.-and for dolphins-was that the
now-familiar labeling provisions established under the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act6" survived the panel's scrutiny
and are considered legal under the GATT. Under the Act, it is a
violation of Section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 6' to
indicate that a tuna product is "dolphin safe" if it was harvested
using methods harmful to dolphins.6' The panel found that the
labeling provisions did not violate provisions of the GATT that
Agreements, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 74, 76(1997) (discussing
the difficulties that arise when one party to an MEA is a non-GATT
member. There is disagreement as to whether the GATT's provisions or
those of the MEA should govern disputes); Rossella Brevetti, WTO Rules
Allow Parties to Join Pacts on Global Environment with Trade Provisions,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 446 (Mar. 16, 2000) (discussing how the
U.S. believes that member nations should be permitted to enter into MEAs
and waive rights under the WTO dispute resolution provisions).
58. The panel stated that "a contracting party may not'restrict
imports of a product merely because it originates in a country with
environmental policies different from its own." Tuna Panel Report, supra
note 47, at 1622.
59. Id. at 1622.
60. Pub. L. 101-627 § 901, 104 Stat. 4465-67 (1990) (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1385, 1685 (1994)).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1) (1994) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994)).
62. The provision reads in part:
It is a violation of section 45 of title 15 for any producer,
importer, exporter, distributor, or seller of any tuna product
that is exported from or offered for sale in the United States
to include on the label of that product the term "Dolphin
Safe" or any other term or symbol that falsely claims or
suggests that the tuna contained in the product was harvested
using a method of fishing that is not harmful to dolphins if the
product contains-
(A) tuna harvested on the high seas by a vessel engaged in
driftnet fishing; or
(B) tuna harvested in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by a
vessel using purse seine nets ....
16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1) (1994).
2000] -CHEVRON, CHARMING BETSY, AND THE URAA
prohibit labels from treating imported products less favorably than
domestic products.63 The panel's ruling indicated that the labeling
provisions do not restrict the sale of tuna products, while recognizing
that consumers benefit from such labels in that they can choose to
purchase tuna products with the "dolphin safe" label.64
B. The Reformulated Gasoline Case
In 1990, Congress amended the Clean Air Act in an effort to curb
air pollution from automobiles.65 Under the new regulations
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
refineries are required to use certain methods and additives that will
reduce harmful emissions.66 The regulations established baselines
using 1990 emissions standards and were to be phased-in over
time.67 The new proposed regulations were meant to apply to both
domestic and foreign manufacturers, but concerns about effective
monitoring and enforcement over foreign imports led the EPA to
impose the regulations on the importers themselves, since the EPA
has jurisdiction over the domestic importers but not over the foreign
exporters.68 Foreign refiners and exporters had their own concerns
about the new regulations. In April 1995, Venezuela and Brazil
requested consultations with the U.S. to discuss the new EPA rules
affecting gasoline imports.69 When a satisfactory solution could not
63. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 47, at 1622. The labeling
provision in the GATT art. IX. 1 reads: "Each contracting party shall accord
to the products of the territories of other contracting parties treatment with
regard to marking requirements no less favourable than the treatment
accorded to like products of any third country." GATT, art. IX.1, supra
note 5.
64. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 47, at 1622.
65. ,See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 211, 212-221,
228(d), Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2488-2500, 2510 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1994)); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7716 (Feb. 16, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1999)).
66. 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7716.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7786.
69. See Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like
Products of National Origin, 35 I.L.M. 274, 277 (1996) [hereinafter
Gasoline Panel Report]. Brazil and Venezuela challenged the specific
provisions that governed how baselines were set for foreign refiners. See
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be reached, Venezuela and Brazil challenged the new regulations
before a WTO panel arguing that they violated the GATT's Most
Favored Nation ("MFN") and National Treatment provisions, 0 in
that they treated gasoline exported from certain third countries more
favorably and benefited U.S. gasoline producers.7
.The panel agreed with Venezuela and Brazil that the EPA
regulations violated the GATT's provisions that prohibit a country
from treating imported products less favorably than domestic
products.72 In comparing the imported and domestic gasoline under
the regulations, the panel held that for the most part, foreign gasoline
and U.S. domestic gasoline were chemically identical, and stated that
the U.S. was not free to discriminate against foreign products.73 The
EPA rule was, therefore, found to discriminate against foreign
refiners. The panel also rejected the U.S.'s argument that the
id. at 279. The purpose of setting baselines is to approximate the national
average parameter values for gasoline used in the U.S. in 1990 and to
maintain those parameters at 1990 levels. 59 Fed. Reg. 7785 n.66 (Feb. 16,
1994). In order to set individual baselines, an individual refiner must
produce evidence of the quality of their gasoline produced or shipped in
1990 ("Method 1"). See Gasoline Panel Report, at 293. An individual
baseline could then be established for that particular refinery against which
future inspections would be made. Unlike domestic refiners, who could
establish individual baselines using other methods, however, foreign
refiners must either adhere to Method I (which was unavailable if evidence
of their 1990 quality levels could not be produced), or adhere to a statutory
baseline based on average characteristics of all gasoline consumed in the
U.S. in 1990. Id.
70. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 69, at 280. The MFN
language provides, in part: "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties." GATT, art. 1. 1, supra note 5. The National Treatment
provisions invoked by the complainants read in part: "The products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin .... ." GATT, art. 111.4, supra
note 5.
71. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 69, at 279-80.
72. Id. at 294.
73. Id. (stating that "chemically-identical imported and domestic
gasoline are like products under Article 111(4)"). See supra note 70 and
accompanying text discussing a portion of the GATT's Article 111.4's text.
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regulations were necessary to protect human health under the
GATT's environmental exceptions.74 The panel concluded that the
EPA regulations were not primarily aimed at conserving natural
resources since, as mentioned above, the panel had already
established that imported and domestic gasolines were chemically
identical." In sum, the panel recommended that the U.S. change the
regulations to comply with the GATT.76 The Appellate Body
affirmed the panel's decision."
In response, the EPA amended its regulations to comply with the
WTO rulings." The proposed amendments loosened the standards
for foreign refiners by giving them the option to either accept the
statutory baselines, or to petition the EPA for permission to establish
individual baselines.79 The EPA acknowledged that the new options
have contributed to concerns over possible environmental impacts,
and addressed these concerns by: (1) establishing benchmarks for
imported gasoline that contributes to adverse environmental effects;
(2) monitoring imported gasoline to ensure compliance with these
benchmarks; and (3) imposing remedies that compensate for
violations of the benchmarks.8" Environmental groups remain
concerned because Venezuelan gasoline contains olefins-a
pollution-forming comppund-in concentrations three times that
allowed by the initial EPA approach.81 While the new regulations do
provide for EPA inspections of foreign refineries, given the EPA's
limited resources, some argue that it is an inadequate solution.82
C. The Shrimp/Turtle Cases
The clash between trade and endangered species protection was
evidenced by recent efforts to protect sea turtles. There are seven
74. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 69, at 296-300. See also
infra note 169 for a description of the GATT's environmental exceptions.
75. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 69, at 294, 299.
76. Id. at 300.
77. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
78. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline
Requirements for Gasoline Produced by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg.
45,533 (Aug. 28, 1997)..
79. See id. at 45,535-36.
80. See id. at 45,537 (footnote omitted).
81. See Wagner & Goldman, supra note 7, at 12.
82. See id.
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species of sea turtles, which are all considered threatened,
endangered, or vulnerable under both international and national
law. 3 A major cause of incidental capture and death for these turtles
occurs when they are inadvertently caught in shrimp-trawling nets
that are pulled along the ocean or sea bottom. " The Secretary of
Commerce is authorized to determine whether any species are
endangered and may issue regulations to protect those species. 5
While an estimated 150,000 sea turtles drown in shrimp nets every
year, turtle-excluder devices reduce the incidental killings by 97%.6
In 1989, Congress passed section 609 of Public Law 101-162
("section 609"), which prohibits the importing of shrimp or shrimp
products from countries without comparable sea turtle protections. 7
The law also requires the U.S. Secretary of State, in conjunction with
the Secretary of Commerce, to initiate bilateral and multilateral
negotiations with other nations to protect sea turtles.88 Finally, the
law bans the importing of shrimp or shrimp products from nations
that have not been certified as using harvesting methods that yield
incidental taking rates consistent with U.S. levels. 9 The regulations
proved to be vulnerable under the GATT.
In an October, 1996 letter, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
(the "Asian Nations") requested consultations with the U.S.
regarding the import restrictions." These consultations did not yield
satisfactory results for the parties. 9' In January 1997, the Asian
Nations requested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body establish
83. Id. at 3. See also Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1537 (1994)).
84. See Report of the Panel on the United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 37 I.L.M. 832, 837
(1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Panel Report].
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
86. See Wagner & Goldman, supra note 7, at 3. "A TED [turtle
excluder device] is a grid trapdoor installed inside a trawling net that is
designed to allow shrimp to pass to the back of the net while directing sea
turtles and other unintentionally caught large objects out of the net."
Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 837 n.613.
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994).
88. Id.
89. See id. (citing Memorandum of the President, Dec. 19, 1990).
90. Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 835.
91. Id.
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a panel to hear the dispute and rule that the U.S. regulations violate
certain GATT provisions.92 As in the Dolphin and Gasoline cases,
the Asian Nations in this case alleged that the U.S. regulations
violated the GATT's general prohibition against import restrictions. 3
They argued that the regulations violated provisions prohibiting
restrictions on imports or exports on any products, unless the
prohibition applies equally to all third countries.94 The Asian Nations
further claimed that the GATT was violated because the U.S. gave
certain countries a three-year, phase-in period to comply with the
U.S. import restrictions, whereas newly affected countries were not
given an extended time period.95 They also asserted that these
different compliance schedules amounted to discriminatory
treatment. The panel noted that the U.S. did not dispute that section
609 effectively amounts to a restriction against uncertified nations. 96
Still, the U.S. argued that all third countries were treated equally
under the law and that the GATT's environmental exceptions
covered the regulations. 97 The panel then turned to the U.S.'s
environmental exceptions arguments.98
The panel rejected the U.S.'s arguments that it could rely on the
GATT's environmental exceptions as an affirmative defense.99 The
panel interpreted the environmental exceptions broadly and stated
that before getting to the individual exceptions, the alleged violative
conduct must be viewed under the broader language of the
provision's chapeau.' °° When the U.S. raised the argument that the
92. Id.
93. Id. at 839; see supra note 50 for Article XI. l's text.
.94. Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 841.
95. Id. at 842.
96. Id. at 840.
97. Id. at 843.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 843-45.
100. Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 849. The GATT's
general exceptions chapeau (or introduction) reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement -by any contracting party of
measures ....
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panel should consider the intent of the U.S. measures-to protect sea
turtles and other marine mammals-and recognize that other
international agreements include similar bans, the panel reminded
the U.S. that there was no such agreement at issue in this particular
dispute."' Rather, the panel stated that .at issue was the U.S.'s
unilateral ban on products that do not meet its environmental
protection standards, which is a violation under the GATT."°2 Instead
of relying on unilateral bans, the panel stated that the WTO's
Committee on Trade and Environment encourages member nations
to adopt multilateral solutions based on consensus and international
cooperation, especially when addressing environmental problems of
a transboundary or global nature.'°3
In the end, the panel held that the U.S. regulations violated the
GATT and were not justified under the environmental exceptions."M
As it did in the other cases, the panel "recommended" that the
Dispute Settlement Body "request" the U.S. to bring this measure
into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement.' 5
GATT, art. XX, supra note 5; Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 844-
51 (discussing how the individual environmental provisions in the GATT
need to be read in light of the entire agreement, which is structured to
promote and facilitate trade between nations). The panel stated that if every
nation unilaterally adopted measures conditioning access to its markets,
including environmental protections, it would not be long before the entire
multilateral trading system would collapse. Id. at 849.
101. See Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 851.
102. See id.
103. See id. See supra note 57 for a discussion on multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs).
104. See Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 857.
105. Id. The panel concluded by stating:
In our opinion, Members are free to set their own
environmental objectives. However, they are bound to
implement these objectives in such a way that is consistent
with their WTO obligations, not depriving the WTO
Agreement of its object and purpose .... We consider that
the best way for the parties to this dispute to contribute
effectively to the protection of sea turtles . . . would be to
reach cooperative agreements on integrated conservation
strategies, covering, inter alia, the design, implementation
and use of TEDs while taking into account the specific
conditions in the different geographical areas concerned.
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The United States appealed the ruling but the Appellate Body
affirmed. °6 In response to the WTO rulings, the State Department
published a notice in the Federal Register proposing several
revisions to the regulations and guidelines used in certifying
importing nations."°7
106. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999).
Although the Appellate Body reached the same conclusion, that the U.S.
laws were not justified under Article XX, it held that the reasoning used by
the panel, interpreting the chapeau of Article XX before considering its
specific provisions, was doctrinal error. The Appellate Body also
determined that the U.S. ban on shrimp and shrimp products was "among
the types of measures covered by Article XX(g), but nevertheless was not
justified because of the particular method in which it was applied." Id. This
has lead some to believe that when properly applied, such restrictions may
be used to achieve certain environmental protections. See also Parker,
supra note 29, at 5 commenting on this part of the Appellate Body ruling:
Recognizing the 1994 addition of principles of sustainable
development to the WTO's normative framework, the
decision faults the manner in which U.S.. trade leverage was
applied on behalf of a common resource (endangered sea
turtles), but not necessarily the fact that trade leverage was
used at all. In so doing, the decision implicitly resurrects
questions that have been off the table in the CTE for the last
four years: whether there is a constructive role for
environmental trade leverage (ETL) in obtaining, as well as
enforcing, agreements to conserve the global commons; and if
leverage is used, how should it be used?
Id. (emphasis in original). Contra Judith Jacobs, Better Integration of
Environment Issues May Create New Barriers, Industry Says, Daily Env't
Report News (BNA), at 111 DEN A-5 (June 10, 1999) (discussing how
despite the adverse ruling of the Appellate Body regarding the U.S. shrimp
import ban, some U.S. business leaders are concerned that this may be a
first step to new barriers being erected in the name of environmental
protection). A DuPont Co. representative, Robert Heine, said "[w]e don't
want to reinvent previous barriers to trade in the name of protecting the
environment." Heine also said, "[i]n the business community, we see great
potential mischief in this aspect of the WTO ruling on the shrimp/turtle
case." Id.
107. See Notice of Proposed Revisions to Guidelines for the
Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the
Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed.
Reg. 14,481 (Mar. 25, 1999) (proposing changes in the regulations'
transparency, overall flexibility, and requiring that nations denied
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D. Ramifications of the WTO Rulings
These cases demonstrate that under a global economic trading
system, such as the GATT/WTO, individual nations can no longer
unilaterally enforce domestic laws with impunity. Many have raised
concerns about eroding national sovereignty, and as these cases
indicate, there appears to be at least some reason for concern. In the
cases discussed above, various WTO bodies heard the disputes and
decided that the United States should change its environmental
protection regulations. Although the WTO has no enforcement
mechanism, the U.S. executive branch has invoked its broad
authority under the URAA and complied with the adverse WTO
rulings each time; the U.S. has not decided to comply because the
WTO may force a nation to amend its laws or regulations. U.S.
courts, of course, do have the authority to strike down regulations as
the next set of cases demonstrates.
E. Private Suits
Another concern for executive branch agencies is that U.S. courts
occasionally compel enforcement of environmental regulations to
more closely comply with the will of Congress. This is, of course, by
itself unremarkable; but when viewed against the backdrop of the
WTO cases, these cases reveal the sensitive nature of the policy
choices that the executive branch must make, and how it must craft
policies and regulations in light of two conflicting sets of decisions:
the first arising from WTO decisions recommending relaxed
enforcement of environmental regulations; the second, from U.S.
courts ordering stricter compliance under federal law. Some of the
holdings of the relevant cases that coincided with the above
addressed WTO cases are examined below.
certification receive notice and explanation for reasons why certification
was denied). See also Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of
Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea
Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8,
1999) (commenting on the previous comments and suggesting further
modifications).
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1. The Private Tuna/Dolphin Cases
As mentioned in the discussion above, the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS") promulgated regulations that included
an embargo option if incidental takings of dolphins exceeded certain
levels for a given year. 8 Under the regulations, a country could,
however, have the embargo reconsidered if it came into compliance
within the embargo's first six months. °9 In 1991, several
environmental groups sued the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, among
other executive branch agencies, on the grounds that the NMFS
violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act and exceeded its
authority by granting countries a six-month extension to comply." 0
Plaintiffs also argued that according to the regulations, the NMFS
could not authorize imports until a nation provided the U.S. with
required data on takings rates, which were required to enforce the
embargo."' The court agreed and issued a temporary restraining
order preventing the NMFS from extending compliance schedules by
six months, holding that delays in enforcing the import ban would
violate the clear intent of Congress."'
The U.S. government appealed the ruling, but the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government's
argument that the court should defer to the agency's discretion." 3
The court also held that executive branch agencies do not have the
authority or discretion to issue regulations that conflict with specific
statutory language and a clear congressional purpose." 4 The court
ordered the government to enforce the embargo against Mexico and
the other countries that were violating the regulations." 5 It was the
108. See supra Part II.A.
109. See'Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to
Commercial Fishing Operations, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921, 11,929 (Mar. 30,
1990); 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.3, 216.24 (1999).
110. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
111. Id. at 969-70.
112. See id. at 972-73.
113. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1452
(9th Cir. 1991).
114. See id. at 1452-53.
115. Id. at 1453.
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enforcement of this embargo that led Mexico to challenge the U.S.
law before the GATT panel.'
1 6
2. The Private Gasoline Case
In 1998, an American gasoline importer sued the EPA over Clean
Air Act regulations that were modified after the WTO held that the
regulations discriminated against foreign refiners under the GATT.1'
The importer claimed that the EPA's regulations went beyond the
agency's statutory authority and were arbitrary and capricious."' The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed and held
that the EPA's revised regulations were neither inconsistent with the
Clean Air Act nor arbitrary and capricious." 9 The court determined
that EPA could consider factors other than air quality and that the
regulations for determining baselines for foreign importers were a
reasonable construction under the Act.120
The court used the two-step analysis from Chevron 2' in evaluating
the challenge to EPA's statutory authority. The court examined the
legislative history of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act and
concluded that Congress had considered the effects that the rules
might have on supplies of foreign gasoline and potential market
interruption. 22 The court held that the EPA's rules, crafted in part to
prevent anticipated market disruptions, were permissible.2 2 The
116. See Tuna Panel Report, supra note 47, at 1599-1600.
117. See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 620
(D.C. Cir. 1998); cf George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 164 F.3d 676 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), modifying certain procedural aspects of the case.
118. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the Clean Air Act
regulations (1) may lead to a degradation in air quality; (2) consider factors
other than air quality, namely the WTO decision, and the effect the
regulations would have on price and supply of imported gasoline; (3)
impermissibly establish options by which foreign refiners may choose
between baseline alternatives; and (4) alter the statutory baselines set by
Congress. Id. at 620.
119. See id. at 620-24.
120. See id.
121. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the Chevron analysis.
122. George E. Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 623.
123. Id. at 624. The court also discussed, in a passage where it is
not clear whether or not it is dicta, not only the permissibility of EPA's
approach to its rulemaking, but the importance of the U.S. honoring its
international obligations under WTO agreements. See id. at 624. The court
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court agreed with EPA that since Congress did not include explicit
language about what factors EPA could or could not consider, the
second-step of Chevron was properly invoked.'24 Therefore, the court
held that it was reasonable for EPA to craft its rules accordingly.
25
3. The Private Shrimp/Turtle Cases
The shrimp/turtle case also had its share of related private
litigation. In 1995, environmental groups sued the U.S. Secretary of
State to enforce section 609 of the Endangered Species Act in order
to better protect sea turtles. 26 Plaintiffs contended, and the Court of
International Trade1 27 agreed, that the statute did not contain any
geographic limitations for enforcement purposes.2 8 Yet, the U.S.
government admitted that it was only selectively enforcing section
quoted the Supreme Court from a 1995 case where the Court held "[i]f the
United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and
have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should
be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such
manner as to violate international agreements." Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros
y Reaseguros, S.A.v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995)). This
aspect of the decision will be discussed below. See infra Part III.D.4.
124. See George E. Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 623-24.
125. Id. at 624.
126. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995).
127. The Court of International Trade's jurisdiction is authorized
by 28 U.S.C. § 1581. See Birgit Kurtz, Note, Dolphins, Sea Turtles, and
Finnish Elks.: Is the Court of International Trade the Proper Forum for
Environmental Disputes?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 111 (1995) (discussing
the history of the Court of International Trade). In 1980, Congress clarified
the court's jurisdiction, among other things, including the court's name; it
had been known as the United States Customs Court.
The scope of the CIT's jurisdiction includes all cases
involving the monitoring and enforcement of international
trade agreements ... [and] the CIT also has exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over an action "that arises out of any law
of the United States providing for . . . embargoes or other
quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise
for reasons other than the protection of the public health or
safety . . .
Id. at 115-16 (citations omitted) (latter alterations in original).
.128. See Earth Island Inst., 913 F. Supp. at 574-75.
170 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL [VOL. XII
609 in certain areas affecting approximately fourteen countries."9
The court also dismissed the arguments of the intervenor, the
National Fisheries Institute, Inc., that similar environmental
provisions have been found to be illegal under the GATT. 3' Still, the
court recognized that by upholding section 609 and compelling
enforcement in the wider Caribbean/Western Atlantic region, the
U.S.'s actions could be subjected to a GATT challenge.'
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the government was not
properly enforcing section 609 and directed the State Department to
prohibit the importation of shrimp if an exporting nation was
uncertified.' 2 The executive branch took steps to comply with the
court's ruling.
In April 1996, the executive branch moved for a one-year
extension to comply with the court's order.' The U.S. government
argued that enforcing section 609 before nations have had adequate
time and notice to implement comparable programs would be
harmful in at least three ways: (1) the U.S.'s ability to protect sea
turtles would be substantially impaired; (2), the embargoes on
uncertified countries would disrupt large amounts of international
trade in shrimp (estimated at around 185 million pounds with an
import value of $850 million per year); and (3) the disruptions in the
exports would cause long-lasting damage in U.S. trade and foreign
policy.' 4 The court rejected these arguments, holding that nations
have been on notice of the certification requirement since the
statute's formal enactment in 1989 and any extensions of time to
comply would be anomalous.'35 The court also stated that in light of
the U.S.'s desire to protect the 124,000 sea turtles that drown every
year, 340 per day when turtle-excluder devices are not used, there
was no justification for modifying the deadline.' The court
concluded by stating that Congress was free to extend the deadline if
it so desired.'37
129. Id. at 563.
130. Id. at 579.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 579-80.
133. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1996).
134. Id. at 619-20.(footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 624.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Again in 1996, the same plaintiffs brought suit in response to a
State Department notice 38 of proposed modifications to section
609.139 Plaintiffs alleged that the proposed guidelines would result in
establishing vessel-by-vessel, instead of country-by-country
compliance, as required. 4 ' The court agreed with plaintiffs and held
that the State Department could not modify the certification
requirements since such modifications would contravene the
unambiguous will of Congress. 4' The government requested a stay
pending appeal, fearing that a new regional treaty to protect sea
turtles would be threatened and a potential backlash from the Asian
Nations would erode progress being made on other programs, where
turtle excluder devices were being implemented.'42
In November 1996, one month before the Court of International
Trade denied the stay, the Asian Nations sought consultations with
the U.S. on the shrimp import ban.'43 Without the stay, the State
Department could not modify the certification procedures to comply
with the court order and with the GATT. In January 1997, with the
State Department's hands tied, the Asian Nations requested that a
WTO panel review the shrimp import ban under the WTO's dispute
138. See Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining
Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp
Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996).
139. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597, 603
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1996), vacated on procedural grounds by Earth Island Inst.
v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
140. See Wagner & Goldman, supra note 7, at 6.
141. Earth Island Inst., 942 F. Supp. at 603.
142. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062,
1065-66 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996), vacated on procedural grounds by Earth
Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In denying the
stay, the Court of International Trade reasoned, in part, that
this country's government must also abide by its own laws,
just as the governments in those lands might be presumed to
do. That their perceptions or lawful interests may digress
from those of the United States should not be reason to
unlawfully abrogate this country's enacted approach. As
pointed out repeatedly herein, this Court of International
Trade is not the proper forum for foreign accommodation or
circumvention.
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. at 1066.
143. See supra Part II.C.
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resolution procedures.144 Of course, as discussed above, the U.S. lost
before the WTO panel. In April 1999, on another appeal by the State
Department, the Court of International Trade once again held that
the State Department's proposed modifications to regulations
pursuant to section 609' on their face were not in compliance with
section 609, and were therefore invalid. "6
III. ANALYZING THE ISSUES FROM A DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE
As the private cases discussed above reveal, the executive branch
is in a sensitive position when it comes to crafting and enforcing
seemingly incompatible trade and environmental policies. It is clear
that the executive branch and its relevant agencies require flexibility
in deciding how to respond, if at all, to adverse WTO rulings.
Indeed, such flexibility is built into the URAA' 47 Any limitations
placed on this flexibility, outside of normal balance of power checks,
whether by Congress or U.S. courts (assuming the acts are not
unconstitutional), may upset the balancing act that makes up modem
U.S. trade policy.'48
Up to this point, this Note has focused on the WTO rulings and
several U.S. court rulings that have not implicated GATT/URAA
provisions directly. The discussion immediately below briefly
examines possible congressional responses to regulation
144. Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 84, at 835.
145. The regulations sought to permit the importation of TED-
caught shrimp from uncertified nations. See Notice of Proposed Revisions
to Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-
162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing
Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,481 (Mar. 25, 1999).
146. Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1081 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1999). The State Department proposed additional modifications
to the rules. See 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8, 1999).
147. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the
U.S.'s available responses under the URAA).
148. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659-63 (2000) [hereinafter Chevron
Deference] (describing the long history of judicial deference to the
executive branch in foreign affairs). Bradley suggests that there are
different types of deference and that most applications correspond to one of
five categories: (1) Political Question deference; (2) Executive Branch
Lawmaking deference; (3) International Facts deference; (4)
Persuasiveness deference; and (5) Chevron-type deference.
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modifications and the constitutional restraints Congress must face in
the process. After considering the restrictions on Congress, the Note
examines a line of cases that suggests that the deference traditionally
afforded to the executive branch in foreign and trade policy matters
may not be perpetually granted by the federal courts if the Charming
Betsy canon is applied in URAA-related cases.
A. Congressional Responses
Congress has yet to respond to any of the regulation modifications
proposed or made by the executive branch in response to adverse
WTO rulings. It has not had to. Private groups have successfully
sued to compel compliance with U.S. laws.'49 But what if certain
statutes did not allow for citizen suits? Or if certain private groups
lacked standing? Or if the NGOs simply lost in court? What could
Congress do if it did not approve of certain regulatory modifications
made in response to WTO rulings? Congress passed the URAA
knowing that certain regulations would be amended initially and in
the future. 5 ° Indeed, the URAA requires the USTR to consult with
Congress and provide an opportunity for public comment in the
Federal Register before regulations are amended.15" ' Consequently,
149. See supra Part II.E.
150. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 3511-3513 (1994). See supra
note 9 and accompanying text. The SAA also addresses the issue of
regulation modification; it even lists twenty-one environmental statutes
entirely unaffected under the URAA. SAA, supra note 14, at 4063. And
Congress was apprised of the progress of the trade agreement negotiations
as the Uruguay Round progressed:
Indeed, the extensive consultations with Congress by the
Executive Branch (especially the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office (USTR)) before, during, and after the Uruguay Round
talks-mandated in part by the fast-track legislation-are an
excellent example of how the Executive Branch can consult
with Congress and take its views into account. Objectives
were developed in advance, there was extensive and frequent
consultations with Senators, Representatives, and their staffs,
and there were consultations with important constituencies in
the business and agricultural sectors.
Barry E. Carter, International Trade Law: Where Congress Has, Somewhat
Hesitantly, Bought Into International Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
335, 336 (1998).
151. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1)(A)-(F) (1994).
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Congress is not a helpless bystander. Yet, the URAA only requires
that the appropriate congressional committees be consulted; it does
not provide remedies if the committees disapprove of changes." 2
Conflicts between the executive and legislative branches in the
context of administrative rulemaking are a long-standing problem.53
Congress may choose among several possible solutions to address
agency rulemaking problems, which may include close oversight and
review of an agency's activity. 54 However, precedent suggests that
this cure may be worse than the disease itself, because in attempting
to address separation of powers issues raised by an agency's activity,
the legislature may itself violate the separation of powers doctrine.1
55
Another dubious remedy available to the legislature is the use of a
legislative veto, which enables it to vote to uphold or reject a
152. Id. § 3533(g)(3). The House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate's Committee on Finance may vote to accept or reject the
proposed regulation changes, but the votes are not binding on the
department or agency. Id. In either scenario, however, a vote by the entire
House or Senate is not required.
153. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 148, at 652
(suggesting that the Chevron doctrine was a response to the growing
administrative state). The issues get even more complex with the addition
of WTO rulings requesting that the U.S. amend its regulations. There is
often, in effect, one unelected body, a WTO tribunal, directing another, an
executive branch agency, to craft regulations to comply with both U.S. law
and with international trade agreements.
154. See Nicholas J. Johnson, There May be Cracks in the
Foundation: An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Current Approach to
Legislative Review of Agency Rulemaking, 94 DICK. L. REv. 637 (1990)
(discussing how states in general and Pennsylvania in particular have
addressed the increasing influence of administrative agencies in modem
governance, and the constitutional problems raised in implementing certain
responses posed by legislatures). The article also addresses these issues on
the federal level. Professor Johnson argues that so-called independent
regulatory review commissions are problematic depending on how they are
characterized. See id. at 640. For example, if a regulatory review
commission is established to review procedures or regulations, and the
commission is categorized as an extension of a legislative agency, serious
separation of powers issues are raised, because the legislative branch may
not unilaterally interfere with the operations of an executive branch agency
without overstepping its constitutional limitations. On the other hand, if the
review commission is considered an executive branch agency, there are
fewer concerns. See id. (footnotes omitted).
155. Id. at 655 n.72.
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particular rule, rule modification or agency decision.'56 Both means,
however, should be used with caution in U.S. foreign and trade
relations where Congress and the executive branch share power.'57
Despite this equal partnership in foreign relations, the executive
branch must remain in a position to take 'the lead in trade and
environmental policy and speak with one voice on behalf of the
nation..5
B. How U.S. Courts Treat the URAA
The constraints on Congress notwithstanding, U.S. courts do have
jurisdiction over executive branch actions through administrative
review powers. The cases reviewed below reveal how U.S. courts
are interpreting the URAA. Because the URAA governs U.S.
commitments to its international trading partners under the WTO,
some courts construe the URAA under international law principles,
even in regulation review cases, despite the URAA's clarity on how
conflicts between domestic laws and commitments under the URAA
are to be treated.'59
156. See id. at 656 n.74 (citing Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
157. The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... ." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3; and the President shall have power "by the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties. .. ." Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
158. As a legislative body, Congress is not well positioned to
assume responsibility for many aspects of foreign policies, despite its
desire and responsibility to scrutinize policies pursued by the executive
branch. It has been suggested that "Congress is simply not capable of
presenting a united front to negotiate and implement changes on a regular
basis. Its members are beholden to parochial constituents and may have
difficulty formulating and maintaining positions that are in the nation's
best interest." Yong K. Kim, Essay, The Beginning of the -Rule of Law in
the International Trade System Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 967, 994-95 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Thus, while it is
true that Congress must eventually approve any agreements signed by the
President, in the current global political milieu, the executive branch has
taken on increasing responsibility-indeed the lead role-in negotiating
foreign policy and trade agreements. Cutting back on the executive
branch's authority and its requisite flexibility through congressional
oversight and budgetary measures does not seem practical or wise.
159. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994).
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1. The Problems with Treating the URAA as an International
Agreement
The executive branch's need for flexibility in responding to WTO
rulings and enforcing environmental policies is clear. It must choose
between competing and, at times, conflicting policy goals of
environmental protection and increased trade, and respond to
adverse WTO rulings as well as U.S. court rulings in private suits
ordering compliance with environmental laws. These complexities
were contemplated and addressed by the URAA and the Statement
of Administrative Action.6 '
The current paradigm, which rests on the executive branch's wide
latitude in choosing whether and how to respond to conflicting
demands, ensures that compromise may be reached when and where
desirable. 6' If courts place the interests of the U.S.'s trading partners
160. See supra notes 9 and 14 and accompanying text. It is also
evident from the URAA that changes in regulations required after passage
were also contemplated. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 3533, 3538 (1994).
161. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the
President's authority to choose whether or not to comply with WTO
rulings). The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") itself
also provides member nations with flexibility to craft a remedy after a
WTO ruling. Under the DSU, when a panel or Appellate Body deems a
measure inconsistent with the GATT's rules, "it shall recommend that the
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity" with the particular
provision or agreement of the GATT. DSU, art. XIX, supra note 6
(footnotes omitted). If the offending nation does not comply, the prevailing
nation has a progression of available remedies such as receiving monetary
compensation or retaliating by suspending concessions granted to the
offending nation. See Amelia Porges, The WTO and the New Dispute
Settlement, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 131 (1994) (discussing dispute
settlement under the GATT and under the WTO). The executive branch
may choose not to comply with a WTO ruling (e.g., not implement
domestic regulation changes), but instead negotiate with the prevailing
nation and pay that nation compensation in the meantime. Paying
compensation is an interim solution that falls between full compliance and
the prevailing nation's retaliation. The DSU states that "compensation
should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is
impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the
measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement." DSU, art. 3.7,
supra note 6. The DSU encourages nations to negotiate solutions to
disputes, and although the DSU's article 3 language limits the use of
compensation to situations when change is impracticable, the DSU's article
22 language is more flexible. For example, it provides that paying
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before those of the U.S., it would be tantamount to making adverse
WTO rulings binding in U.S. courts. Currently, they are not. A court,
by so doing, might introduce an ironic twist on the sovereignty
concern raised by URAA opponents. 6 2 Strangely, if U.S. courts
compel U.S. compliance, genuine sovereignty concerns would be
realized for the first time.
2. Chevron-Plus
U.S. courts are reviving the Charming Betsy canon and applying it
in agency review cases. This new approach poses problems. This
new "Chevron-plus "'63 test could lessen the number of choices now
available to the executive branch and Congress when facing adverse
WTO rulings. If such a Chevron-plus test becomes the majority view
in U.S. courts, it would add more uncertainty to the future and
integrity of U.S. environmental laws than the adverse WTO rulings,
compensation should not be "preferred to full implementation of a
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity .... Compensation is
voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements."
Id. at art. 22.1 (emphasis added). And nations may enter negotiations "with
a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation." Id. at art. 22.2. It
should be noted that- this remedy is available after a panel or Appellate
Body has made its decision. Thus, it is clear that the Final Act encourages
member nations to cooperate and negotiate before and after formal
settlements are undertaken. However, if a U.S. court orders compliance
with a WTO ruling by invoking Charming Betsy, it would be effectively
eliminating these remedies or, at least the flexibility they foster-now
available under the DSU. See also Pieter Jan Kuyper, Remedies and
Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to be Effective? The State
Perspective and the Company Perspective, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
282 (1997) (suggesting that paying compensation to the prevailing nation
is consistent with and equivalent to "the general international law remedy
of damages" and that dispute settlement remedies should include
compensation and suspension of concessions "as full alternatives to
compliance, just as is the case in general international law."). Id. at 284.
162. See supra notes 7 and 10 (discussing environmental and
sovereignty concerns of environmentalists).
163. A Chevron-plus test would essentially combine Chevron's
two-part analysis of the judicial deference to Congress or to an executive
branch agency with the Charming Betsy canon where a court would in
effect, by allowing Charming Betsy to trump Chevron, defer to another
nation by construing an act of Congress in such a way so as to not violate
international law.
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since U.S. courts are not bound by WTO rulings."6 Furthermore, if
U.S. courts consider U.S. international obligations when hearing
URAA-related litigation, the U.S. government would be bound by
such rulings. Scholars and U.S. courts continue their attempt to
characterize the URAA in order to determine whether the GATT's
provisions should ever trump domestic legislation, as the cases
discussed below demonstrate.'65 Until this issue, whether or not
Charming Betsy has a place in URAA-related litigation, is resolved,
questions about the executive branch's and Congress's abilities to
fully integrate trade and environmental policies will linger.
3. Why Understanding the Characterization of the URAA is
Important
It is important to unwrap the legislative package comprising the
URAA in order to understand the legislation. The URAA is the
164. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
165. Although many factors figure into the debate evaluating the
place of international law within U.S. law in general, and the URAA in
particular, there are two major schools of thought: (1) the monists, who
view obligations under international law and domestic law as comprising a
single legal system; and (2) the dualists, who view international law as a
discrete legal system that may be augmented by domestic legislation. See
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 864-66
(1987) (discussing that in a monist system, "[d]omestic courts must give
effect to international law, anything in the domestic constitution or laws to
the contrary notwithstanding."). Id. at 864. Most believe that the U.S.
position cannot be considered strictly monist. Id. at 870. See also Leonard
M. Shambon, PROC. OF THE EIGHTH JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. CT. OF INT'L
TRADE, 149 F.R.D. 245, 257 (1992) (suggesting that "U.S. law is a hybrid
of the two approaches."). In a dualist system, international agreements are
often considered non-self-executing and require implementing legislation
to take effect; See S. REP. NO. 103-412, pt. 2, at 13 (1994) (not adopted),
available at 1994 WL 687802 ("The WTO Agreement and other Uruguay
Round agreements, like previous trade agreements including the North
American Free Trade Agreement... are not self-executing and thus their
legal effect in the United States is governed by implementing legislation.").
The URAA is in this category. As the adjudication of URAA-related cases
in U.S. courts demonstrates, a majority of U.S. judges adhere to a dualist
approach and have interpreted the URAA as giving way to .conflicting
domestic law. Some courts, however, are applying Charming Betsy in a
monist fashion and stressing the importance of the U.S.'s international
obligations.
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domestic legislation codifying the U.S.'s obligation under the WTO.
The international nature of these obligations has led to confusion
among some scholars, practitioners, and U.S. courts regarding the
threshold issue of whether the URAA is essentially an international
agreement, governed under principles of international law, or
whether it is simply domestic legislation that includes international
obligations. 66 Some federal courts are reviving the ancient canon of
construction, the Charming Betsy, and applying it in cases where
domestic statutes conflict with international obligations. 67 This
approach, however, contravenes the plain language of the URAA.
C. The URAA Text
The URAA explicitly addresses potential conflicts between the
URAA and other U.S. law. When a conflict arises, GATT
obligations do not prevail over other U.S. laws.'68 The language even
166. See PROC. OF THE EIGHTH JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. CT. OF
INT'L TRADE, supra note 165, at 257-59, 286-93 (discussing the
relationship between U.S. law and international law generally, in light of a
sweeping 1992 U.S. court of appeals decision that ruled that the GATT
cannot trump domestic law). This case, Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas v. United States, 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992), is discussed
infra Part III.D. 1.
167. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
168. The provision reads in part:
(a) Relationship of agreements to United States law
(1) United States law to prevail in a conflict
No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the
United States shall have effect.
(2) Construction
Nothing in this Act shall be construed-
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States,
including any law relating to-
(i) the protection of human, animal, or plant
life or health,
(ii) the protection of the environment, or
(B) ... unless specifically provided for in this Act.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (emphasis added). Perhaps because the
final GATT agreement was new when the URAA was passed and the
GATT's environmental exceptions untested, Congress decided to make its
intent clear, that environmental standards should not be eroded.
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appears to track specific environmental exceptions in the GATT
itself. '69 The URAA also provides guidance to the courts on how to
interpret congressional intent in the case of a legal conflict. 70 In
preparing to enact the URAA, Congress and the President, who
negotiated the agreements, amended certain U.S. statutes and
regulations in order to bring them into compliance with the GATT. 7'
169. The environmental protections in the GATT read in part:
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
GATT, art. XX(b), (g), supra note 5 (emphasis added).
170. See supra note 14 (discussing how the SAA is treated in the
URAA and the weight it should be given in a judicial proceeding). The
SAA is a document prepared by the executive branch and submitted to
Congress along with the draft bill implementing the agreement. It
"represents an authoritative expression by the Administration concerning
its views regarding the interpretation and application of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, both for purposes of U.S. international obligations and
domestic law." Deleverde, SrL v. United States, 989 F. Supp. 218, 230
n. 18 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (emphasis in original).
171. The statute reads, in part:
(1) the President may proclaim such actions, and
(2) other appropriate officers of the United States Government
may issue such regulations,
as may be necessary to ensure that any provision of this Act,
or amendment made by this Act, that takes effect on the date
any of the Uruguay Round Agreements enters into force with
respect to the United States is appropriately implemented on
such date ...
(b) Regulations
Any interim regulation necessary or appropriate to carry out
any action proposed in the statement of administration action
approved under section 3511 (a) of this title ... shall be issued
not later than 1 year after the date on which the agreement
enters into force with respect to the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 3513(a)-(b) (1994). The URAA defines the procedures that the
executive branch agencies (including the U.S. Trade Representative) must
follow when responding to an adverse WTO panel or Appellate Body
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And, though there may be some obvious inherent tensions between
different executive branch 'agencies in carrying out U.S. trade and
environmental policies, it is clear from the SAA that these agencies
may consider URAA obligations.7 2 A court, however, must first find
a conflict between an existing U.S. law and a URAA provision
before it can determine which provision prevails.
1. When is there a Conflict?
There are at least three approaches courts take when considering
whether a conflict exists between U.S. law or regulations and a
provision of the URAA. The first emphasizes the supremacy of U.S.
law over the GATT; the second looks to the GATT's provisions in
an attempt to harmonize them with U.S. law; and the third sidesteps
ruling and when modifications in U.S. regulations are recommended. See
19 U.S.C. § 3533 (1994).
172. The SAA reads in relevant part:
This Statement describes significant administrative actions
proposed to implement the Uruguay Round agreements. In
addition, incorporated into this Statement are two other
statements required under section 1103: (1) an explanation of
how the implementing bill and proposed administrative action
will change or affect existing law; and (2) a statement setting
forth the reasons why the implementing bill and proposed
administrative action are necessary or appropriate to carry out
the Uruguay Round agreements.
SAA, supra note 14, at 4040; cf Berniece A. Browne, PROC. OF THE
TENTH JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. CT. OF INT'L TRADE, 185 F.R.D. 395, 479-
81 (1997). Browne stated:
If the agency argues [before a U.S. court] that what they are
doing is consistent with the international agreement, as the
government understands that argument . . . then I think the
Court is putting the Chevron doctrine on top. I think courts
have to give a lot of deference to the Executive Branch on the
interpretation of the international agreement.
Id. at 480. As to what extent agencies may consider international
agreements, Browne said, "[c]ertainly, the agency would always have the
[international] agreement in mind, although I must say it is very much in
the back of our mind because our view is statutory. Our view is that the
statute is what we are guided by." Id. at 482.
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the issue and often declares that there is no conflict at all.'73 Another
important, unresolved, and rarely addressed issue, is deciding which
U.S. statute provides the rule of decision in URAA-related cases: a
particular environmental statute or the general catch-all provision in
the URAA, stating that in a conflict U.S. law should prevail.'74 The
answer to this question-which rule of decision governs-will
naturally help determine the outcome of a court's decision. For
example, it is likely that not all Clean Air Act provisions or their
related legislative history address precisely what Congress intended
regarding potential conflicts between achieving clean air and the
U.S.'s obligations to its trading partners. Therefore, if Congress is
silent on a particular matter within the Clean Air Act, a court
applying a strict constructionist approach and Charming Betsy might
find that no conflict exists, and therefore could compel the U.S. to
honor its international obligations, possibly at the expense of
environmental protection.
On the other hand, if the URAA catch-all supremacy language,
which provides that existing U.S. law will prevail in a conflict with
URAA obligations, is intended to address Congress's silence in any
and all existing statutes, then as long as a court finds a conflict, the
executive branch would be free to decide whether and when to
173. See Leonard M. Shambon, PROC. OF THE EIGHTH JUD.
CONF. OF THE U.S. CT. OF INT'L TRADE, supra note 165, at 258
(concluding that most cases up until that time fell into the first category).
174. Federal courts that sua sponte invoke Charming Betsy may
also violate the principles established by the Erie doctrine. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479,
513-24 (1-997) [hereinafter Charming Betsy] (reiterating the Supreme
Court's announcement in Erie that ... [t]here is no federal general common
law."' Id. at 514 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938) (alteration in original))). Bradley describes the history of the
Charming Betsy canon and the shifts that have occurred in legal thinking
since the nineteenth century. Id. at 514. Bradley also states that although
scholars continue to disagree on the scope and role of federal common law,
"many agree that, in light of Erie, this lawmaking is proper only if
authorized in some fashion by either the Constitution or federal
legislation." Id. at 516 (citations omitted). Therefore, even though federal
courts may hear cases that have international consequences, it does not
mean that federal courts may choose which law to apply. Erie still governs.
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respond to conflicting obligations.'75 The cases examined below
demonstrate that this important and unresolved issue of whether
there is a conflict-and if so, which statute provides the rule of
decision-has not fully evolved.'76 The remainder of this paper
examines how, in .recent decisions, some U.S. courts are
sidestepping the conflict issue altogether, and instead applying the
Charming Betsy canon.
*D. Other URAA-Related Cases Revealing the GATT's Status in U.S.
Law: Chevron, Charming Betsy, and the URAA
1. GATT Cannot Trump Domestic Legislation
In addition to the environmental cases discussed above, another
line of cases reveal a split among the federal courts as to whether
Charming Betsy should be applied in URAA-related cases. In
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States,' the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to review a decision by
175. See Donald B. Cameron, PROC. OF THE EIGHTH JUD. CONF.
OF THE U.S. CT. OF INT'L TRADE, supra note 165, at 288 (stating that the
discussion of U.S. law prevailing in a conflict begs the initial question of
whether or not there is a even conflict with which to begin the analysis).
176. For example, in Fed. Mogul Corp. -v. United States, 63 F.3d
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995), discussed infra Part III.D.3, the court casually
discusses the "conflict issue." Compare id. at 1580 ("Defendants plausibly
argue that the reading of the Act urged by plaintiffs is in direct conflict
with obligations arising under ... (GATT))," and id. at 1581 ("It remains
true, however, that in the event of a conflict between a GATT obligation
and a statute, the statute must prevail....."), with id. at 1582 ("We find
Commerce's interpretation of the Act to be within the terms of the statute,
and not in conflict with any precedents of this court or the Supreme
Court."). In the first passage, the court refers to "conflict" in reference to
the reading of an Act of Congress in relation to U.S. obligations under the
GATT; in the second, it refers generally to a conflict between a U.S. statute
and a GATT obligation; and in the third it references the Commerce
Department's interpretation as not being in conflict with the court's own
precedents and those of the Supreme Court. When read closely, the opinion
reveals that the concept and usage of "conflict" in the 19 U.S.C. § 3512
context shifts even in one court's interpretation. That there is no uniform
understanding of "conflict" among federal courts at this time is no surprise.
The need for a precise, consistently applied rule of construction in URAA-
related cases is evident.
177. 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the Court of International Trade that vacated Department of
Commerce anti-dumping orders.178 In 1987, U.S. manufacturers
asked the Department of Commerce to investigate and issue orders
condemning Venezuelan manufacturers' practices that allegedly
violated U.S. anti-dumping laws.179 The Department of Commerce
investigated the practices and concluded that certain Venezuelan
manufacturers were selling electrical conductor materials at less than
fair value and condemned the practices.18O The court reversed and
held that in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary,
the Department of Commerce's actions on behalf of U.S. electrical
conductor manufacturers were permissible under a Chevron
analysis. 8' By issuing its determination, the court's application of
U.S. law allegedly came into conflict with the GATT's anti-dumping
provisions, and the Venezuelan manufacturers urged the court to
interpret U.S. law in a way that would be consistent with U.S.
obligations under the GATT.182 The court refused, holding that
despite these obligations "[t]he GATT does not trump domestic
legislation."'83 Although some considered the opinion to be weak,'84
178. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1994), the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over decisions appealed
from the U.S. Court of International Trade. See also Kurtz, supra note 127,
at 114 n.25; Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.39
(5th Cir. 1993).
179. Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 660-64.
180. Id. at 662-63.
181. Id. at 665, 667-68.
182. Id. at 667.
183. Id. at 667-68. The court cited the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a), which governed trade relations at the time, and
which tracked the supremacy language now found in the URAA. The court
held that
even if we were convinced that Commerce's interpretation*
conflicts with the GATT, which we are not, the GATT is not
controlling. While we acknowledge Congress's interest in
complying with U.S. responsibilities under the GATT, we are
bound not by what we think Congress should or perhaps
wanted to do, but by what Congress in fact did. The GATT
does not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory
provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the GATT, it is
a matter for Congress and not this court to decide and remedy.
Id. (citations omitted); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 200
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal
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it remains the flagship case cited by most courts when URAA-
related conflicts arise. 1
85
statute while rejecting Carnival Cruise Lines' arguments that doing so
violates U.S. GATT obligations). The Carnival Cruise Lines court held
that while the statute in question may violate the GATT,
[n]either our trading partners nor the World Trade
Organization has taken final formal action directed against the
Harbor Tax. It is speculative and conjectural whether they
will do so. If they take such action and the result is to create
serious problems, either the executive or the legislative
branch presumably will take appropriate action.
Id. at 1369 (emphasis added); Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp.
2d 1332, 1337 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (following Suramerica and holding
that "[i]f a statute is inconsistent with international obligations, 'it is a
matter for Congress and not [the] court to decide and remedy."' (quoting
Suramerica, at 668) (alteration in original)).
184. See Don Cameron, Jr., PROC. OF THE EIGHTH JUD. CONF. OF
THE U.S. CT. OF INT'L TRADE, supra note 165, at 287-88 (criticizing the
opinion for rejecting the role of international law in what appeared to be a
casual opinion). "[T]he question is whether or not Suramerica is
authoritative law to the effect that international law has no role in U.S.
adjudication. If it is, then I think we are in trouble." Id. at 288. Opposing
views were also offered:
Well, I am not going to try to interpret exactly whether
Suramerica was absolutely determinative once and for all of
the issue for the Federal Circuit, but it sounded pretty clear to
me, because the Court says that the GATT does not trump
U.S. law. Frankly, I am reminded of the bumper sticker that I
used to see that has something to do with the issue of textual
interpretation. It says, God said it, I believe it, and that settles
it. In the trade area, Congress steps into the shoes of God.
Once Congress says something, that is the law.
Michael P. Mabile, id. at 288.
185. But see Thomas William France, Note, The Domestic Legal
Status of the GATT: The Need for Clarification, 51 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1481, 1508-09 (1994) (stating that the court in Suramerica did not find a
conflict and simply deferred to the Commerce Department's interpretation
of the statute in question). Therefore the case "does not provide much
guidance as to what courts should do when faced with two plausible
statutory interpretations, one of which conflicts with the GATT." Id. at
1509 (footnote omitted).
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2. GATT Further Diminished in Hierarchy of U.S. Law
Suramerica's precedence took hold right away and was expanded
in 1993 by the Fifth Circuit in Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v.
Madigan.8 6 In this case, the court reviewed Department of
Agriculture ("DOA") regulations governing imported poultry
examining whether the term "same," used to assess quality
standards, comported with Congress's intended meaning of that
term.'87 Using the Chevron analysis, the court determined that the
regulations violated the clear intent of Congress, thus, ending the
analysis after step one. 88 The court also rejected the DOA's
argument that an act of Congress should never be construed to
violate international law. 89 The court stated that the Charming Betsy
canon advocated by' the DOA had never been used in cases involving
international commercial law; rather it was traditionally invoked
when rules of international public law or sovereignty issues were at
stake. 9 ' Citing Suramerica, the court held that the GATT could not
186. 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993).
187. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1361-62. Some of the relevant
language reads: "all imported poultry products shall ... be subject to the
same inspection, sanitary, quality, species verification, and the residue
standards applied to products produced in the United States; and ... have
been processed in facilities and under conditions that are the same as those
... in the United States." Id. at 1361 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (alterations
and emphasis in original)). The Secretary of Agriculture argued that the
term "same" did not have to mean identical but could be interpreted as "at
least equal to." Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1361.
188. See Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1363-65.
189. See id. at 1365 (quoting Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
190. Id. at 1367; Footwear Distribs. and Retailers of Am. v.
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994). The Footwear
court followed the Miss. Poultry decision and stated:
political decisions balancing domestic and foreign interests
were the prerogative of the executive branch, not the courts.
Such criticism echoes the Supreme Court's admonition that
while questions implicating foreign policy determinations are
not completely beyond the scope of judicial cognizance,
courts should be reluctant to review these matters because
"resolution of such issues frequently turn[s] on standards that
involve the exercise of discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or the legislature."
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trump domestic legislation. 9' The court then dismissed the DOA's
final argument, that the court should approve the regulations in
question in light of the U.S.'s GATT obligations and the executive
branch's exclusive authority over foreign affairs, noting the
demarcation where the President controls foreign affairs and
Congress controls foreign commerce.192 Although this young
doctrine of diminishing the GATT's importance seemed firmly
established, it did not go unchallenged.
3. GATT Prominence Raised
In Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States,193 the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit seemed intent on pruning back the Fifth
Circuit's broad rejection of the Charming Betsy canon in Mississippi
Poultry. The court examined whether the International Trade
Administration and the Department of Commerce ("Commerce")
exceeded their congressional authority in establishing tax and anti-
dumping regulations on foreign products. 94 The court was asked to
review the Court of International Trade's decision that held
Commerce's regulations were not permissible. 95 The plaintiffs, two
U.S. corporations, urged the court to reject Commerce's
interpretation of the statute and to adopt a reading of the statute that
would have conflicted with provisions in the GATT.'96 Commerce
urged the court to consider the case consistent with the U.S.'s GATT
obligations. 97 The court reversed after determining that the statute in
question was ambiguous, concluding that Commerce was entitled to
Footwear Distribs., 852 F. Supp. at 1096 (quoting Roger P. Alford, The
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and
European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (1992)
(citations omitted) (alterations in original)). But see France, supra note
185, at 1517-18 (arguing that the court in Miss. Poultry failed to account
for the increasing importance of the GATT in U.S. law, even if it may be
conceded that it is not a traditional international agreement).
191. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1365-66.
192. See id. at 1367 (footnotes omitted).
193. 63 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
194. See id. at 1574, 1578-79.
195. See id. at 1574.
196. Id. at 1576 (citing the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §
1677(a) (1988)), 1579-81.
197. Id. at 1580-81 (citing the GATT's anti-dumping provisions).
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Chevron deference.'9 8 In addition, the court agreed with Commerce
and pointed out that the GATT was incorporated into U.S. law."'
Despite the court's acknowledgment of Suramerica's holding, and
the URAA's supremacy language stating that U.S. law will prevail in
a conflict, the court deferred to Commerce's interpretation and
invoked Charming Betsy, holding that "absent express
Congressional language to the contrary, statutes should not be
interpreted to conflict with international obligations. 2 0 The court
also emphasized that the international deference called for in the
doctrine applies if it "affect[s] neutral commerce,"'' clearly
responding to, without directly addressing, the Mississippi Poultry
court's point that the doctrine has not been traditionally applied to
foreign trade matters. 2 The Federal Mogul court helped establish
Charming Betsy's place in URAA-related litigation.
4. WTO Obligations Recognized
Without hesitation, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed that Charming Betsy should be applied in
trade matters.2 ' In George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, discussed
above," 4 the court appended a Charming Betsy analysis to its
Chevron analysis. The Petitioner, an American gasoline importer,
challenged amended EPA regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Clean Air Act, which were subsequently amended in response to a
WTO ruling.20 5 The Petitioner complained that EPA acted beyond its
authority in considering factors other than air quality in crafting the
regulations, e~g., the adverse WTO ruling,20 6 and that the regulations
treated foreign refiners and importers differently than domestic
198. Fed. Mogul, F.3d at 1578-80.
199. Id. at 1581. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act was
implemented into U.S. law on January 1, 1995.
200. Id. at 1581.
201. Id. (emphasis in original).
202. See Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1367
(5th Cir. 1993).
203. See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
204. See supra Part II.E.2.
205. See George E. Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 620.
206. Id. at 620, 623.
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refiners.2 7 The court cited part of the Clean Air Act's legislative
history indicating that Congress indeed considered factors other than
air quality, such as potential market disruptions of foreign imports."8
Then it determined that because Congress was silent on the method
EPA was to use in gathering data from foreign refiners, step one of
Chevron was satisfied."° The court indicated that petitioner failed to
point to anything in the statute's text prohibiting EPA from
considering other factors, 20 holding that in light of Congress's
silence and the WTO decision, these other factors may be
incorporated into the regulations.2 1 Therefore, the court held that
under step two of Chevron and Charming Betsy, EPA's regulations
were permissible.212 The court's reasoning, however, may have
created more problems than it solved.
a. Problems Raised by the George E. Warren Court's Approach
First, in its analysis, the court surreptitiously, or perhaps,
carelessly, moved from discussing what EPA may do in light of
congressional silence to discussing what the court could do when
deciding cases involving international law.21 This shift in the court's
207. Id. at 619.
208. Id. at 623. According to the court, the purpose of the
amendments tothe Clean Air Act under review, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8), is
to:
maintain average emissions per gallon from conventional
gasoline at no more than 1990 levels, [and] the specific
approach adopted by the Congress makes full achievement of
that goal less than certain. This result apparently reflects a
legislative compromise between two potentially conflicting
goals-avoiding degradation of air quality and not disrupting
the market for conventional gasoline.
Id. (citing 136 CONG. REc. 35,759 (1990)). Cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, No. 99-1257, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1952 (distinguishing George E.
Warren Corp. as construing a section of the CAA that permits EPA to
consider costs). Id. at * 18 n. 1. In addition, the Court unanimously upheld
the framework and application of Chevron. See id. at *23 n.4, *39-*40.
209. George E. Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 624.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Consider the. court's language: "In the particular
circumstances of this case our usual reluctance to infer from congressional
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analysis may seem innocuous, since, after all, international law is a
part of federal law and federal courts have jurisdiction in such
cases."' The court applied the new approach, which invokes
Chevron and Charming Betsy, but went further and distorted its
Chevron analysis. The court revealed its willingness to consider the
U.S.'s international obligations in light of Congress's silence in
order to get past step one to reach step two. Then, the court appeared
to say that step two is partially satisfied by the EPA's desire to be
WTO-compliant.1 5 While it seems reasonable to acknowledge that
EPA would consider U.S. obligations while crafting its regulations,
making that consideration part of Chevron's second step may have
undesired and unintended consequences."' If the decision is
silence an intention to preclude the agency from considering factors other
than those listed in a statute is bolstered by the decision of the WTO
lurking in the background." Id. at 624. The court then quoted a 1987
Supreme Court case that cited the 1804 Charming Betsy case: "Since the
days of Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that congressional statutes must be construed wherever possible in a
manner that will not require the United States 'to violate the law of
nations."' Id. (quoting S. African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 125
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)). The court also cited a 1995 Supreme
Court case, as if to further strengthen its rationale, although the case
involved the validity of a forum selection clause and did not invoke the
GATT: "If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of
international accords and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral
endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before interpreting its
domestic legislation in such a manner as to violate international
agreements." Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995)).
214. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. e. (1987). The Restatement provides:
Cases arising under treaties to which the United States is a
party, as well as cases arising under customary international
law, or under international agreements of the United States
other than treaties, are "Cases ... arising under ... the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their
Authority," and therefore within the Judicial Power of the
United States under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
Id. at cmt e. (alterations in original).
215. See George E. Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 624.
216. Id. at 622. The court summarized Chevron's step two when
Congress is silent: "If the Congress has not addressed the issue, however,
then ... we will defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable in
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extended to other similar cases it may upset the delicate balance
established by the URAA and SAA, and inadvertently impede'the
availability of responses afforded the executive branch and
Congress." 7
Second, WTO rulings are not binding on U.S. courts;" 8 they
cannot change U.S. laws, and the URAA specifically contemplates
that the executive branch may decide whether and how to respond to
WTO rulings."9 If courts incorporate Charming Betsy and compel an
otherwise reluctant executive branch to accommodate another
nation's interests, it could only serve to weaken executive branch
resolve and to limit its choices. The court admitted that the EPA
regulations in question survived a Chevron analysis.2 Therefore, the
court's "Chevron-plus " analysis, not having changed the outcome in
this case, is not dispositive. A court's decision to apply Charming
Betsy in a future case, however, might yield the opposite result.
Whereas in this case, the outcome was unchanged (EPA's
regulations were deemed reasonable), applying the Charming Betsy
analysis in a future agency review case could just as easily result in a
light of the structure and purpose of the statute." Id. at 622 (citing Chevron
at 843) (emphasis added)). The court correctly cited other factors that
Congress considered in the legislative history, which led to the
determination that EPA may also consider such factors. But, as Chevron
provides-and as the court noted-'the regulations must consider the
statute for which the regulations are being promulgated-not other factors
"lurking in the background." This construction goes beyond what Chevron
allows.
217. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, Rules and Principles, Chap. 2 (1987) ("When
international law is not given effect in the United States because of
constitutional limitations or supervening domestic law, the international
obligations of the United States remain and the United States may be in
default."). "Similarly, the United States remains bound internationally
when a principle of international law or a provision in an agreement of the
United States is not given effect because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution." Id. § 115 cmt. b. See also Henkin infra note 236 (discussing
that even when bound by international agreements the U.S. is free to
violate them).
218. Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334,
1343 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) ("[T]he WTO report itself has no binding effect
on the court.").
219. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
220. See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
192 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL [VOL. XII
court deciding that an agency's regulations violate international law.
Otherwise, if a court could not use Charming Betsy to compel
compliance with international obligations, there would be no point in
applying it in the first place.2
Third, the court's analysis is confused, in that twice, the court
refers to the U.S.'s WTO obligations as "treaty obligations. 222 While
this distinction may appear trivial, it underscores the confusion
221. In other words, if Congress is silent on a particular provision
of the Clean Air Act, step two of Chevron allows the court to decide
whether the agency acted reasonably according to the will of Congress. In
George E. Warren Corp., EPA modified its regulations in an effort to
make them WTO-compliant. But EPA, in accordance with the USTR,
could have decided not to comply, and instead "pay the fine" under WTO
dispute resolution provisions. See supra notes 6 and 161 for a discussion of
the DSU. In such a case, the U.S. would admittedly be in violation of its
international obligations. If the URAA is viewed as falling under the
auspices of international law, it is in precisely such a case that Charming
Betsy could, in principle, be applied to compel the EPA to craft regulations
that do not conflict with international law-but which may effect an
inferior result from a domestic environmental law perspective. After all,
that is what this interpretation of the canon stands for. Thus, although the
cases discussed in this section (Federal Mogul, George E. Warren Corp.)
yielded decisions where Charming Betsy did little more than bolster the
agencies' intent to be WTO-compliant, the value and utility of such a
canon of construction is highly questionable. Courts should avoid using
Charming Betsy like Damocles' sword, unsettling the executive branch's
policy choices, which range from full compliance to accepting retaliation.
See infra note 258 for a hypothetical involving the George E. Warren
Corp. case.
222. George E. Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 623-24. The court
stated:
The petitioners do not direct our attention to anything in the
text or structure of the statute to indicate that the Congress
intended to preclude the EPA from considering the effects a
proposed rule might have upon the price and supply of
gasoline and the treaty obligations of the United States.
Id. at 623 (emphasis added). The court also stated:
[I]n this case, moreover, that consideration appears to be
congruent with both the congressional purpose not to disrupt
the market for imported gasoline and the Supreme Court's
instruction to avoid an interpretation that would put a law of
the United States into conflict with a treaty obligation of the
United States.
Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
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surrounding the URAA, regarding its characterization and
components. While there was genuine disagreement during the
congressional debates as to what type of agreement GATT was
before passage (a treaty, a congressional-executive agreement, or a
new type Of international instrument), 23 since its passage, these
characterization debates have subsided, because it is clear that the
URAA language, along with the legislative history, explicitly state
how U.S. law relates to obligations under the URAA. 24 Reopening
these characterization debates would make predicting the future of
environmental regulations much less certain.
Finally, given that the court stated that EPA may consider U.S.
international obligations, it might not take much for courts to extend
the rationale and hold that an executive branch agency, and/or the
court itself, must consider international obligations.25 The Charming
Betsy language states that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains,.' 221 It is certainly feasible to imagine a court
interpreting this language in a way that could compel the executive
branch to uphold its international obligations, as implied by the
George E. Warren Corp. court. The problem with this approach is
that currently the executive branch may choose whether and how it
.223. Compare GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings to
Review Trade Agreements Concluded Under the Uruguay Round of GATT
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Including Provisions Establishing the
World Trade Organization. Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 290-
317 (Oct. 18, 1994), microformed on CIS No. 94-S261-62 (Cong. Info.
Serv.) (statement of Lawrence H. Tribe, Law Professor, Harvard
University) (urging the Congress to treat the URAA as a treaty obligation),
and (statement of Bruce Ackerman, Law Professor, Yale University)
(arguing that the URAA covers too much ground to be considered by the
President and Senate alone. Professor Ackerman suggests that the URAA
be treated under normal Article I procedures-a Bill passed by both houses
of Congress and signed by the President-thereby ensuring democratic and
constitutional protections). After the House bill (H.R. 5110) passed in both
houses (the Senate did not vote on its bill, S. 2467), the President signed
the URAA under normal constitutional procedures.
224. See supra note 168 discussing how GATT obligations relate
to U.S. law. See also supra notes 9 and 14 and accompanying text.
225. The Hyundai court made such a move. See infra Part
III.D.5.
226. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
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will respond; compelling it to do so will contravene the directives in
the URAA and turn the entire statutory scheme on its head.
5. Courts Must Apply Charming Betsy along with Chevron when
Faced with Congressional Silence
In 1999, the Court of International Trade stated that in the absence
of an explicit directive from Congress regarding a specific statutory
provision the court must consider whether the relevant agency
formulated its regulations consistent with the GATT provision in
question.227 The case involved a Commerce Department decision to
not revoke an outstanding anti-dumping order it issued that was
harmful to Korean semiconductor manufacturers.22 The order was
issued in compliance with the GATT's anti-dumping provisions and
survived the Chevron analysis.2 9 In the statute, Congress did not
address precisely how Commerce was to revoke anti-dumping orders
once a review revealed that an order was no longer justified. 3 Yet,
after applying a "Chevron-plus " analysis, the court determined that
Commerce fulfilled its mandate from Congress in consonance with
U.S. international obligations. 3' The court then declared that
"Chevron must be applied in concert with the Charming Betsy
227. See Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d
1334, 1343-44 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (following Federal Mogul and
holding that in congressional silence, the Charming Betsy principle must
be applied along with a Chevron analysis). This is a clear and significant
departure from the traditional Chevron analysis. It now appears that under
step two of Chevron, when Congress is silent on the matter, instead of
determining whether the agency acted reasonably and giving the agency
deference, "under the Charming Betsy doctrine, the Court must consider
whether Commerce formulated its regulation consistent with [the relevant
GATT provision]." Id. at 1344 (emphasis added). The Hyundai court was
careful to point out, however, that "unless the conflict between an
international obligation and Commerce's interpretation of a statute is
abundantly clear, a court should take special care before it upsets
Commerce's regulatory authority under the Charming Betsy doctrine." Id.
at 1345.
228. Id. at 1335.
229. Id. at 1337.
230. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provided Commerce
with the authority to revoke anti-dumping orders after an administrative
review. Id. at 1339-40. The revocation regulations under review are set out
in 19 C.F.R. §353.25(a)(2) (1999). Id. at 1336.
231. Id. at 1344.
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doctrine when the latter doctrine is implicated. 23 2 Thus, the Hyundai
court's decision helped to move URAA-related analysis far from its
starting point in Suramerica.
232. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Edward DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trade Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75
(1987), which held that the combination of the two doctrines should be
used "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems .'. . unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress"). DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
DeBartolo did not involve the GATT or international issues. It examined
the National Labor Relations Board's construction of the National Labor
Relations Act, where the Board issued an order prohibiting union members
from distributing handbills that posed serious First Amendment questions.
The Court determined that the NLRB was not entitled to Chevron
deference. Id. at 568. In DeBartolo, however, the Court applied Charming
Betsy in a different manner. It used it as a general rule of construction that
is invoked when the constitutionality of a statute is under review. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
114 (1987) (stating "[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to be
construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States."). The Reporter's Notes
clarify the Restatement's, and the DeBartolo Court's, usage of the
Charming Betsy principle: "The phrase 'where fairly possible' derives
from one of the principles of interpretation to avoid serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of a federal statute, set forth by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. TWA." Id. at n.2 (citations omitted). While the Court makes
it clear that this is a legitimate use of and variation on the Charming Betsy
canon, the Hyundai court used it in its more traditional international
context, thus bringing into question its applicability in Hyundai. See supra
Part III.D.5. It would appear then, that there are two different applications
of Charming Betsy to solve two different problems. See also Bradley,
Chevron Deference, supra note 148, at 685-86 (suggesting that this
variation on the Charming Betsy doctrine is based in error by the Supreme
Court). Bradley states that the DeBartolo Court relied on an earlier case,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), where the
Court mistakenly replaced the 'international law deference principle' with
the 'unconstitutional-avoidance' principle, thus, in effect, expanding the
Charming Betsy canon. Id. at 686. Bradley concludes that "there is no such
admonition in the Charming Betsy decision, only the admonition about not
violating international law." Id. Bradley also suggests that lower courts
have followed this precedent and have concluded that Charming Betsy
trumps Chevron when both are invoked. See id. at 686-87. Professor
Bradley also points out that "[t]here is at least one important functional
difference between the Charming Betsy canon and the constitutional
canon: if Congress clearly violates the Constitution, courts will enforce the
Constitution; if Congress clearly violates international law, courts will
196 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [VOL. XII
IV. THE PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE CHARMING BETSY CANON IN
URAA CASES
A. Surveying the Precedents
The rules of construction adopted by U.S. courts between 1992-
2000 show a wide range of opinions and approaches to adjudicating
cases that invoke both Chevron and the Charming Betsy canon. The
approach adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Suramerica in 1992 stated that the GATT could not trump domestic
legislation.233 In late 1994, the GATT was made a part of U.S. law
when the URAA was codified.3 By 1999, the Court of International
Trade stated that in the absence of contrary congressional intent,
U.S. courts must consider both the Chevron and Charming Betsy
doctrines in regulation review cases where international obligations
arise, and in such cases, Charming Betsy trumps Chevron.235 It is
unclear whether a majority view on this issue will emerge among the
various federal circuit courts, and if one does, which one will
prevail. If one view becomes the majority, it will have profound
effects on the future and integrity of U.S. environmental laws and
regulations when those laws and regulations conflict with the
GATT's provisions. The remaining discussion examines the
problems inherent in a "Chevron-plus" analysis.
B. General Problems in Applying International Law Principles in
URAA Cases
When U.S. courts apply international law canons, such as
Charming Betsy, in administrative review cases, a number of
problems arise. First, like U.S. court judges, scholars have been split
on how international law generally intersects with U.S. domestic
law,236 and how URAA provisions are to be specifically construed.237
enforce the statute." Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 174, at 527.
Therefore, until the Court clarifies this variation on Charming Betsy,
reliance on the Catholic Bishop-DeBartolo line of cases in administrative
review/international trade cases may be suspect.
233. See supra Part III.D. I.
234. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 227-232 and accompanying text.
236. See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555 (1984) (concluding that while international
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Second, the problem with analyzing URAA provisions as
international obligations governed under international law is that
adopting such an approach would require a court to drag along with
it the panoply of cumbersome principles that come with international
law?.38 A court's analysis would be incomplete if it selected only
law is binding on the United States, U.S. courts only adopt these principles,
they do not make them). Id. at 1555-61. In addition, since Congress has
not created international law and cannot modify it, the President should be
free to violate it, without intervention by the courts, whenever it is in the
national interest to do so. Id. at 1561-62, 1567. The Restatement provides:
The GATT is an international agreement, but its status as
international law cannot be stated simply. Like other
agreements, it is binding upon states that are parties to it ....
[I]ts status as a commitment of the United States is not in
doubt, and courts in the United States assume its binding
character.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 8, chap. 1, introductory note (1987). The Restatement has not addressed
the GATT since it was finalized in 1994, or its new legal personality under
the WTO.
237. See supra note 223 for a discussion on the characterization
of the URAA.
238. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. a. (1987) (stating
when an act of Congress and an international agreement or a
rule of customary law relate to the same subject, the courts,
regulatory agencies, and the executive branch will endeavor
to construe them so as to give effect to both. The courts do
not favor a repudiation of an international obligation by
implication and require a clear indication that Congress, in
enacting legislation, intended to supersede the earlier
agreement or other international obligation.
(emphasis added)); and id. § 112 cmt. c:
[c]ourts give particular weight to the position taken by the
United States Government on questions of international law
because it is deemed desirable that so far as possible the
United States speak with one voice on such matters .... Even
views expressed by the Executive Branch as a party before the
court or as amicus curiae will be given substantial respect
since the Executive Branch will have to answer to a foreign
state for any alleged violation of international law resulting
from the action of a court.
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isolated rules of construction while ignoring others. In addition,
some commentators have criticized the general use of canons of
construction in the post-Erie era."' Indeed, it may be unwise to
pluck a single fruit off the tree of international law simply because it
appears appetizing.
C. Justiciability
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on why federal courts
should refrain from applying Charming Betsy in URAA cases where
Chevron has been invoked. This is based on language in the URAA
and SAA and for reasons concerning the balance of power between
the branches. Another important reason only hinted at thus far is the
issue of justiciability. Justiciability considers whether an action is
appropriate for judicial intervention and whether a judicial remedy is
possible. 4 ° There is no question that federal courts have jurisdiction
Id.; with Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1568-69 (1984) (concluding that
[s]ince neither Congress nor the President is constitutionally
denied the authority to make decisions in disregard of
international law, the courts will not require either the
President or Congress to observe international law, nor will
the courts invalidate such acts on the ground that they violate
international law or a treaty of the United States.
Id. (footnote omitted)).
Therefore, even within the body of foreign relations/international law,
Charming Betsy seems to be only one canon in the well of international
law into which all branches of government may dip. The URAA text and
the SAA, when bolstered with the many principles of international law
found in the Restatement, all lead to the conclusion that a court should not
single out Charming Betsy to compel deference to an international trading
partner, especially if such a decision is disguised behind the mask of the
court's administrative review powers.
239. See Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 174, at 504-09.
240. A justiciable controversy is defined as a:
controversy in which a present and fixed claim of right is
asserted against one who has an interest. in contesting it;
rights must be declared upon existing state of facts that may
or may not arise in the future .... Courts will only consider a
"justiciable" controversy, as distinguished from a
hypothetical difference or dispute or one that is academic or
moot. Term refers to real and substantial controversy which is
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over matters involving international law under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution24' and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.242 However, although
such matters are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts, nevertheless, they are still constrained by the requirements of
justiciability.2 3 The question is not whether federal courts may hear
appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from
dispute or difference of contingent, hypothetical or abstract
character.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (6th ed. 1991).
241. Article III of the U.S. Constitution reads in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority . . . to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party ... and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States ....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
242. Congress ensured this jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
by classifying it as a federal question. It states "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). The
Restatement reads in part:
Cases arising under treaties to which the United States is a
party, as well as cases arising under customary international
law, or under international agreements of the United States
other than treaties, are "Cases ... arising under ... the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their
Authority," and therefore within the Judicial Power of the
United States under Article 11, Section 2 of the Constitution.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 (2) (1987) (alterations in original) (emphasis added). Thus, regardless
of how the URAA is categorized, federal courts have jurisdiction over
international cases under Article III.
243. The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law states
"[c]ases arising under international law or international agreements of the
United States are within the Judicial Power of the United States and,
subject to Constitutional and statutory limitations and requirements of
justiciability, are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 (2) (1987) (emphasis added). The Comments state that an action arises
under international law "if the plaintiffs complaint properly asserts a
justiciable claim based upon such international law or agreement." Id. at
cmt. e. Without a foreign plaintiff asserting a justiciable claim and seeking
redress, a federal court raising and then applying international law
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cases that implicate the URAA, but rather whether they should
provide de facto relief to a foreign nation not a party to the suit, by
providing a remedy not sought, and injecting ancient international
law principles not raised.2" If a party sues the United States
government under the URAA, a federal court would, of course, have
the duty to hear the case. But in some cases, e.g., George E. Warren
Corp., federal courts have raised Charming Betsy when there has
principles on its own may constitute a potential misuse of judicial
authority. Certain cases may also be deemed non-justiciable if they are
seen as "political questions." See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529, at 279 (1984). Justice Powell outlined
a modem three-part test for political question doctrines: "(i) Does the issue
involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to
a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question
demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?" Made in
the U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1254-55 (N.D.
Ala. 1999) (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979)).
244. See supra notes 213-226 and accompanying text for
discussion of why federal courts should refrain from interfering in cases
involving foreign affairs and international trade. Chief Justice Warren
discussed justiciability and the Court's authority to hear "cases and
controversies" and stated:
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two
complimentary but somewhat different limitations. In part
those words [cases and controversies] limit the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process. And in part those words define
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.
Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to
this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-
and-controversy doctrine.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968), quoted in CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529, at 281
(1984).
2000] CHEVRON, CHARMING BETSY, AND THE URAA 201
been no foreign nation party to the suit.245 In such cases, the
requirements of and limitations on justiciability may not be met. 46
Ironically, the Chevron doctrine itself was born out of judicial
restraint and self-imposed prudential limitations on the Court's own
authority.247 Yet, Charming Betsy, on its face, invokes the court's
latent authority to construe statutes in ways it deems appropriate in
an effort to avoid conflict with another nation's interests. Justice
Stevens' decision in Chevron demonstrates the Court's own
willingness to limit its authority by deferring to the political
branches when agency regulations come under review: step one
defers to Congress when a statute's language is clear, and step two
defers to an executive branch agency when Congress is ambiguous
or silent. 48 While the decision did not reveal the precise doctrinal
basis for the Court's analysis, it is undeniable that the Court itself
245. The cases described above were justiciable cases. It is less
clear whether a court providing relief for unrepresented foreign nations
violates the justiciable issue or controversy principle.
246. The Supreme Court had earlier "defined justiciability as
turning on 'whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its
breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted
can be judicially molded."' Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v.
Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241, 1244 (1st Cir. 1973) (citing Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). In 1999, the U.S. government was sued by
several labor groups alleging that the legislation implementing the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was unconstitutional because it
violated the Treaty Clause of the Constitution. See Made in the U.S.A.
Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999). The
government claimed that the district court should avoid judicial review of
international trade agreements such as NAFTA and the GATT because
federal courts have traditionally resisted review of international agreements
entered into by the President with the approval of Congress, unless the
President and Congress reach an impasse regarding such international
agreements. See id. at 1268 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997,
1005 n.1 (1979)). The court held that it had the authority to review
plaintiff's claims because the Act's constitutionality was under review and
disagreed with the government's position. In its conclusion, however, the
court held that the legislation implementing NAFTA and the process under
which it was passed was constitutional. See Made in the U.S.A. Found., 56
F. Supp. 2d at 1322-23.
247. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 148, at 652
(suggesting that Chevron deference has direct practical significance in
foreign affairs given the overlap between domestic and international law).
248. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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created Chevron and it is still good law.249 Because justiciability
limits both a court's ability to hear international law matters on the
one hand and agency review cases on the other, it seems there is
little authority for a court to single out and apply the Charming Betsy
canon in agency review cases while trumping Chevron.25°
Finally, the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law provides
guidance when a federal statute conflicts with a U.S. international
obligation. It is clear that the federal statute will be given effect.2 1 If
249. See Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to
Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis For Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council; 1991 WIS. L. REv. 1275,
1277 (1991). Professor Callahan asserts that most traditional assumptions
for Chevron's doctrinal basis, Congress's delegating authority to an
agency, or the externally imposed separation of powers doctrine, are
incorrect. Id. In her article, Callahan states that Chevron deference
is a principle of self-restraint, related to the various well-
established prudential limitations on justiciability in the
federal courts. Because no convincing indication that the
Chevron result was compelled by external forces exists,
Chevron is best understood as having established what is
essentially a rule of abstention in favor of another government
decision-maker.
Id. at 1289.
250. When a court places the Charming Betsy canon onto the
second rung of Chevron's stepladder it invites problems. Few would
disagree that if the intent of Congress is clear within a statute, an agency
must conform its regulations accordingly; the analysis ends after step one.
And, if a WTO obligation happens to conflict with that provision, a U.S.
court would not hesitate to give the statute effect. Why then, when
Congress is silent on a particular matter-triggering analysis under step
two-would a court assume that Congress and the executive branch do not
intend to retain their respective legislative and administrative powers in
carrying out trade and environmental policy? It is unreasonable to assume
that the political branches intend to relinquish these powers to the judiciary
each time Charming Betsy is shoe-homed into Chevron's second step,
simply because Congress has not addressed each and every interpretive
contingency a court may face in reviewing statutes and regulations.
251. The Charming Betsy canon is found in section 114 of the
Restatement. It states: "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to
be construed so as to not conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987). However, the
Comment suggests that couirts are not obliged to weigh conflicting laws
and offer automatic deference, as implied by Chief Justice Marshall's
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a U.S. court hears a case in which a plaintiff invokes international
law and seeks a judicial remedy, international law and Charming
Betsy may be applied. If the U.S. government decides to disregard
an international obligation, and in its holding in a URAA-related
case, a U.S. court gives effect to a conflicting federal statute, the
U.S. might then be in violation of international law.25 Nevertheless,
the U.S., acting through the two political branches, is free to make
such a choice.253 U.S. courts should not interfere to effect a contrary
result.254
CONCLUSION
Conflicting trade and environmental policies implemented
simultaneously by the U.S. are not necessarily incompatible. The
URAA and the Statement of Administrative Action provide a
roadmap for U.S. courts in construing the GATT's provisions. The
markings are clear. When followed, they reveal the intent of the
executive branch and of Congress. The executive branch and
Congress anticipated the unique nature of the URAA and provided
explicit guidance to future administrations, congresses and courts
when URAA provisions are implicated. WTO rulings are not binding
original opinion; but rather the "principle of interpretation in this section is
influenced by the fact that the courts are obliged to give effect to a federal
statute even if it is inconsistent with a pre-existing rule of international law
or with a provision of an international agreement of the United States." Id.
at cmt. a (emphasis added). This, of course, should be considered along
with the URAA's own supremacy language discussed earlier. See supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
252. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 115(1)(b) (1987) (stating that a federal law superceding
an international obligation "does not relieve the United States of its
international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that
obligation.").
253. See Henkin, supra note 236 and accompanying text.
254. Federal courts are limited in their ability to effectively
synthesize foreign policy because they "'lack the necessary informational
resources, the ability to adjust to diplomatic nuance and timing, and the
appropriate remedial resources to respond to the international political
dynamic."' Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 174, at 525 n.267
(quoting Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International
Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 462 (1993)).
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on U.S. courts, and the executive branch may choose whether and
how to respond to such rulings. Despite the concerns of WTO
detractors, that U.S. sovereignty is threatened, the Constitution and
U.S. law still govern to protect U.S. interests. Ironically, it may be
the application of international law principles, such as Charming
Betsy, by U.S. courts that will ultimately weaken U.S. environmental
laws if the executive branch is compelled to comply with the U.S.'s
international obligations.
U.S. courts should continue to apply the Chevron analysis in
agency review cases when the URAA is implicated. It should not
raise additional concerns for the courts simply because the
regulations in question may have been promulgated in response to,
or in anticipation of, WTO obligations.255 As long as the statute in
question is constitutional, and the regulations are considered
reasonable, the courts should continue to defer to the executive
branch, since it negotiated the final GATT agreement, suggested
ways in which the agreement should be interpreted, and Congress
has conceded that the Statement of Administrative Action should be
given particular weight when interpreting the URAA.256 A rule of
construction as unpredictable as Charming Betsy was not likely
anticipated-nor is it likely now welcomed-by the executive
branch and Congress when the URAA was passed. In certain cases,
Charming Betsy may upset not only the delicate balance of powers
255. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 148, at 687-88
(suggesting that while administrative agencies do not possess special
expertise in making constitutional determinations, the executive branch as
a whole does have expertise in international affairs).
256. See THE SIXTEENTH ANN. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. CT. OF
APP. FOR THE FED. CIR., 193 F.R.D. 263 (1999) (discussing the Charming
Betsy doctrine and its application to WTO agreements). A participant in
the Conference's proceedings asserted that in agency regulation review
cases that implicate the URAA, a court may compel an agency to consider
the U.S.'s international obligations when crafting its rules. See Joseph
Dorn, id. at 411. However, if the agency comes back to the court and
claims that international obligations were considered but the regulation
could not be amended to conform to such agreements, the court should
then defer to the agency after it has considered the international obligations
under step two of Chevron. Id. A Commerce Department official added
that when agencies consider international obligations while amending
regulations, those agencies should enjoy the same deference from a court
as afforded them under a standard Chevron analysis. See Marguerite
Trossevin, id. at 412-13.
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reflected in the URAA, but it may undo the benefits built into the
final legislation.5 7
Applying Charming Betsy in URAA-related cases can only serve
as a means to one of two ends: it will either affirm an outcome
resulting from a sound Chevron analysis, in which case it
substantively adds nothing; or, in a case where a court compels an
otherwise reluctant executive branch agency to. comply with WTO
obligations, it would upset the balance and flexibility required to
maintain the integrity of U.S. environmental laws as well as affect
U.S. sovereignty. In the first instance, the Charming Betsy analysis
is unnecessary; in the latter case, it may be unwise.
Some may suggest that these concerns are unfounded, given that
in the cases where Charming Betsy has been used to bolster an
executive branch agency's decision to modify a regulation, the
outcome of the decision was not changed and the will of the
executive branch was not thwarted. Such a view, however, would
fail to appreciate that a court could have just as easily used
Charming Betsy more as a stick requiring WTO compliance than as
a carrot affirming the executive branch's voluntary actions.258
257. Consider, however, that at their core, Charming Betsy and
Chevron are alike in that they both rely first on a statute's language before
permitting courts to trigger their interpretive powers. But, if a court is
willing to go through a statutory analysis using Chevron, it should not then
skip this requisite analysis, which is also required in a Charming Betsy
analysis. See also Bradley, Charming Betsy, supra note 174, at 524-26
(suggesting that Charming Betsy itself can operate to enforce the balance
of powers between the branches of government).
258. For example, in the George E. Warren Corp. emissions
case, assume the EPA had decided not to modify its regulations in response
to the WTO ruling, and instead retained the regulations that treated foreign
refiners differently, and which did not allow foreign refiners to set
guidelines using all options available to domestic refiners. Assume too,
that the challenger in the case was a domestic gasoline refiner that was
concerned, as EPA was in the original case, that foreign refiners could not
and likely would not meet the stringent U.S. standards. The court would
then be faced with the same adverse WTO ruling, indicating that the EPA
rule was in violation of the GATT's rules that prohibit member nations
from treating countries differently. What would be different in this
hypothetical would be (1) the EPA's refusal to comply; and (2) a plaintiff
urging that EPA should change its regulations in accordance with the
WTO ruling (unlike in George E. Warren Corp., where the plaintiff urged
the EPA to not comply with the WTO ruling). In a "Chevron-plus"
analysis, where a court would apply Charming Betsy after doing a Chevron
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The URAA should be viewed as legislation in the domain of
foreign affairs, where traditional deference is given to the executive
branch, or as governing commerce, traditionally under the control of
Congress. 59 In the current global political milieu, U.S. courts should
offer even more deference in these matters, given the increasing
prominence of trade in U.S. policies, as well as the importance of
maintaining the integrity of U.S. environmental laws.26 The most
effective way for the U.S. to manage these policies is for the
executive branch and Congress to fully exercise all legal, political
and policy choices available under the URAA and the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Agreement without interference from U.S.
courts. In such an arrangement, the decisions would remain in the
political arena where they belong and accountability and sovereignty
would be truly preserved.26
analysis, it is feasible that the court could just as easily compel WTO
compliance, if, for example, the section of the Clean Air Actunder review
was silent on Congress's will on how to handle conflicts. This is the type
of hypothetical that could occur if the Charming Betsy analysis is
permanently appended to Chevron analysis when both are implicated. It is
not that paying occasional homage to Charming Betsy in itself is
threatening to environmental laws. In theory, when it is dusted off and used
as a rubber stamp to seal a Chevron analysis, there appears to be little
reason for concern. But, it is in those circumstances wherein it is expanded
to undo policy choices of the executive branch and Congress that its
applicability is questioned here.
259. The President "shall have Power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties . . . ." U.S..CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
"The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; See also Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d
1359, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Even though the Executive Branch does have
exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, the Constitution grants Congress
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. To the extent that a
dispute exists over possible foreign policy implications to the GATT, we
decline to enter the fray." (footnote omitted)).
260. This is not to suggest that courts have no role in
international trade matters. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. But
when the activities or laws involved are constitutional, in light of
traditional deference extended to the executive branch, and in light of the
URAA text, U.S. courts should hesitate before interfering.
261. Indeed, in his Chevron decision, Justice Stevens stated that
when an agency rule comes under review in order to probe the agency's
wisdom, the challenge must fail. And in such a case
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Under a Chevron analysis, courts play a vital role in interpreting
URAA provisions in agency review cases. Chevron is still a useful
fulcrum on which to balance the powers of the branches of
government.262 By applying Chevron, the courts fill the gaps in
agency accountability left by constitutional constraints such as those
galvanized in Chadha. By using a Chevron analysis, courts can
check executive branch agencies' actions in a way that Congress
cannot under Chadha. Therefore, as long as Chadha limits
Congress's responses to executive branch agencies, Chevron is
needed to preserve a constitutional balance of power. Charming
Betsy adds nothing to ensure constitutional integrity, agency
accountability, or environmental protection.263 Augmenting the
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views
of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution
vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984) (citation omitted).
262. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 148, at 673
(revealing that in a series of recent cases, all nine Justices of the Supreme
Court reaffirmed their support for Chevron's basic framework, thereby
suggesting that Chevron deference remains on solid ground).
263. Under Chevron, the judicial branch ensures that the
executive branch does not violate the will of the legislative branch by
construing a statute in a way that would contravene the will of Congress.
Such a framework is sound and constitutionally necessary. Under a
"Chevron-plus" analysis, by adding Charming Betsy, the judiciary would
be allegedly protecting the executive branch from itself. In effect, all that
would be accomplished would be for a court to ensure that the part of the
executive branch that is responsible for promulgating environmental
regulations, e.g., the EPA, does not step on the turf of another part of the
executive branch that is responsible for trade regulation, e.g. the U.S.
Trade Representative. If the courts feel the need to intervene in URAA-
related cases and assure that the balance of powers between the executive
and legislative branches are maintained, the two-step test from Chevron
provides that protection. Otherwise, if Congress continues to remain silent
in these conflicts-indeed it wrote the URAA giving the executive branch
specific authority to act-the courts should do so as well. Cf Bradley,
Charming Betsy, supra note 174, at 524 (proposing an alternate conception
of the Charming Betsy canon based on the separation of powers doctrine,
in contrast to its traditional conceptions: (1) the legislative intent and (2)
the internationalist conceptions). Id. at 484-85, 524. Therefore, if the
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analysis with international law canons, such as Charming Betsy, will
introduce too much unpredictability, and would add little to the
outcome, save an erosion of the U.S.'s ability to choose how best to
respond to difficult policy choices.2 ' For these reasons, U.S. courts
should refrain from applying Charming Betsy in agency review
cases when URAA provisions conflict with existing environmental
laws.265 If courts need more than a statute's text in order to cull out
Congress's intent, they need look no further than the URAA, the
Statement of Administrative Action, and its legislative history.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of
deferring to the executive branch and Congress in foreign affairs,
and the limited role that states and the judiciary play in this area. In
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Counci, 66 the Court granted
certiorari to determine whether a Massachusetts statute that placed
sanctions on Burma (Myanmar) due to alleged human rights
violations was unconstitutional. 67 The Court held that because
Congress passed a similar statute,268 the Massachusetts statute was
Charming Betsy canon is used in tandem with Chevron in its separation of
powers conception, it would not be antithetical to Chevron-it would
actually compliment it.
264. See supra note 258 for an example of how the court's
application of Charming Betsy could have compelled an otherwise
reluctant EPA to modify Clean Air Act regulations, despite that under the
URAA, the executive branch may decide to not comply with a WTO
ruling.
265. Contra Debra P. Steger, PROC. OF THE TENTH JUD. CONF.
OF THE U.S. CT. OF INT'L TRADE, supra note 172, at 483-84 (speaking as a
former WTO Appellate Body member and stating that governments are
obliged to withdraw measures deemed violative of the GATT). In addition,
it was offered that under GATT's rules, governments no longer have all of
the response choices once available. Id.
266. 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000).
267. See id. at 2289. The statute, An Act Regulating State
Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma (Myanmar),
1996 Mass. Acts 239, ch. 130 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 7:22G-
7:22M, 40 F, 1/2 (1997)), sought to ban the state from doing business with
companies that transacted business with Burma.
268. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-
167 (enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, §
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preempted and its application was unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause.269 The Court also stressed the need for the
executive branch to exercise discretion and authority, granted by
Congress, in developing consistent foreign policy.2 70
The Massachusetts statute was also challenged by Japan and the
European Union before the WTO as violating governmental
procurement provisions in the GATT.27' The President complained
that the Massachusetts statute interfered with U.S. foreign
relations.27 ' The Court reiterated that the executive branch and
Congress control foreign affairs and that states and courts do not.2
The Court recognized that the two political branches need flexibility
in order to conduct foreign policy, without interference from other
actors, and the decision affirms the principle that judicial
intervention into foreign affairs should be avoided. 74
101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172) (imposing mandatory and
constitutional sanctions on Burma).
269. Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2299.
270. In referring to the conflicting state and federal statutes, the
Court stated that "the state Act is at odds with the President's intended
authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations in
developing a 'comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to
and improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma."' Id.
at 2299 (citing § 570(c) of the federal statute).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2301. The Court stated that although it does not
unquestioningly defer to the executive branch's legal interpretations of all
federal statutes,
We have never questioned their competence to show the
practical difficulty of pursuing a congressional goal requiring
multinational agreement. We have, after all, not only
recognized the limits of our own capacity to "determin[e]
precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular
acts," . . . but consistently acknowledged that the "nuances"
of "the foreign policy of the United States ... are much more
the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of
this Court .... "
Id. at 2301 (citing Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 194, 196 (1983); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.,
512 U.S. 298, 327-29 (1994) (first and third alterations in original)
(emphasis added)).
274. Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2301. See also Bradley, Charming
Betsy, supra note 174, at 523 (stating that
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Erie requires that all law applied by the federal courts be
either federal or state law, which means that federal courts
can no longer apply international law of its own force. Erie
thus negates the premise of the internationalist conception
"that the [international law] norms operate without the
mediation of a political branch."
(citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
